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Abstract
How can several individualsprobability assignments to some events be
aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this
problem assume that the set of relevant events the agenda is a -algebra
and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction (intersection).
We drop this demanding assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pool-
ing on general agendas. One might be interested in the probability of rain
and that of an interest-rate increase, but not in the probability of rain or
an interest-rate increase. We characterize linear pooling and neutral pool-
ing for general agendas, with classic results as special cases for agendas
that are -algebras. As an illustrative application, we also consider prob-
abilistic preference aggregation. Finally, we unify our results with existing
results on binary judgment aggregation and Arrovian preference aggrega-
tion. We show that the same kinds of axioms (independence and consensus
preservation) have radically di¤erent implications for di¤erent aggregation
problems: linearity for probability aggregation and dictatorship for binary
judgment or preference aggregation.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of probabilistic opinion pooling. Suppose sev-
eral individuals (e.g., decision makers or experts) each assign probabilities to some
events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a
collective probability assignment, while preserving probabilistic coherence? Al-
though this problem has been extensively studied in statistics, economics, and
philosophy, one standard assumption is seldom questioned: the set of events to
which probabilities are assigned  the agenda  is a -algebra: it is closed un-
der negation (complementation) and countable disjunction (union) of events. In
practice, however, decision makers or expert panels may not be interested in such
a rich set of events. They may be interested, for example, in the probability of
a blizzard and the probability of an interest-rate increase, but not in the proba-
bility of a blizzard or an interest-rate increase. Of course, the assumption that
the agenda is a -algebra is convenient: probability functions are dened on -
algebras, and thus one can view probabilistic opinion pooling as the aggregation
of probability functions. But convenience is no ultimate justication. Real-world
expert committees typically do not assign probabilities to all events in a -algebra.
Instead, they focus on a limited set of relevant events, which need not contain all
disjunctions of its elements, let alone all disjunctions of countably innite length.
There are two reasons why a disjunction of relevant events, or another logical
combination, may not be relevant. Either we are not interested in the probability
of such articialcomposite events. Or we (or the decision makers or experts) are
unable to assign subjective probabilities to them. To see why it can be di¢ cult
to assign a subjective probability to a logical combination of basicevents such
as a blizzard or an interest-rate increasenote that it is not enough to assign
probabilities to the underlying basic events: various probabilistic dependencies
also a¤ect the probability of the composite event, and these may be the result of
complex causal interconnections (such as the causal e¤ects between basic events
and their possible common causes).
We investigate probabilistic opinion pooling for general agendas, dropping the
assumption of a -algebra. Thus any set of events that is closed under negation
(complementation) can qualify as an agenda. The general notion of an agenda is
imported from the theory of binary judgment aggregation (e.g., List and Pettit
2002, 2004; Pauly and van Hees 2006; Dietrich 2006; Dietrich and List 2007a,
2013; Nehring and Puppe 2010; Dokow and Holzman 2010; Dietrich and Mongin
2010). We impose two axiomatic requirements on probabilistic opinion pooling:
(i) the familiar independencerequirement, according to which the collectively
assigned probability for each event should depend only on the probabilities
that the individuals assign to that event;
(ii) the requirement that certain unanimous individual judgments should be
preserved; we consider stronger and weaker variants of this requirement.
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We prove two main results:
 For a large class of agendas with -algebras as special cases any opinion
pooling function satisfying (i) and (ii) is linear : the collective probability
of each event in the agenda is a weighted linear average of the individuals
probabilities of that event, where the weights are the same for all events.
 For an even larger class of agendas, any opinion pooling function satisfying
(i) and (ii) is neutral : the collective probability of each event in the agenda
is some (possibly non-linear) function of the individualsprobabilities of that
event, where the function is the same for all events.
We state three versions of each result, which di¤er in the nature of the unanimity-
preservation requirement and in the class of agendas to which they apply. Our
results generalize a classic characterization of linear pooling in the special case
where the agenda is -algebra (Aczél and Wagner 1980 and McConway 1981).1
For a -algebra, every neutral pooling function is automatically linear, so that
neutrality and linearity are equivalent here (McConway 1981 and Wagner 1982).2
As we will see, this fact does not carry over to general agendas: many agendas
permit neutral but non-linear opinion pooling functions.
Some of our results apply even to agendas containing only logically indepen-
dent events, such as a blizzardand an interest-rate increase(and their nega-
tions), but no disjunctions or conjunctions of these events. Such agendas are
relevant in practical applications where the events in question are only proba-
bilistically dependent (correlated), but not logically dependent. If the agenda is
a -algebra, by contrast, it is replete with logical interconnections. By focusing
on -algebras alone, the standard results on probabilistic opinion pooling have
therefore excluded many realistic applications.
We also present a new illustrative application of probabilistic opinion pooling,
namely to probabilistic preference aggregation. Here each individual assigns sub-
jective probabilities to events of the form x is preferable than y(or x is better
than y), where x and y range over a given set of alternatives. These probability
1Specically, if the agenda is a -algebra (with more than four events), linear pooling func-
tions are the only pooling functions which satisfy independence and preserve unanimous prob-
abilistic judgments (Aczél and Wagner 1980, McConway 1981). Linearity and neutrality (the
latter sometimes under the names strong label neutrality or strong setwise function property) are
among the most widely studied properties of opinion pooling functions. Linear pooling goes back
to Stone (1961) or even Laplace, and neutral pooling to McConway (1981) and Wagner (1982).
For extensions of (or alternatives to) the classic characterization of linear pooling, see Wagner
(1982, 1985), Aczél, Ng, and Wagner (1984), Genest (1984), Mongin (1995), and Chambers
(2007). All these works retain the assumption that the agenda is a -algebra. Genest and Zidek
(1986) and Clemen and Winkler (1999) provide surveys of the classic literature. For opinion
pooling under asymmetric information, see Dietrich (2010). For the aggregation of qualitative
rather than quantitative probabilities, see Weymark (1997). For a computational, non-axiomatic
approach to the aggregation of partial probability assignments, where individuals do not assign
probabilities to all events in the -algebra, see Osherson and Vardi (2006).
2This assumes that the -algebra contains more than four events.
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assignments may be interpreted as beliefs about which preferences are the correct
ones (e.g., which correctly capture objective quality comparisons between the al-
ternatives). Alternatively, they may be interpreted as vague or fuzzy preferences.
We then seek to arrive at corresponding collective probability assignments.
Each of our linearity or neutrality results (with one exception) is logically
tight: the linearity or neutrality conclusion follows if and only if the agenda
falls into a relevant class. In other words, we characterize the agendas for which
our axiomatic requirements lead to linear or neutral aggregation. We thereby
adopt the state-of-the-art approach in binary judgment-aggregation theory, which
is to characterize the agendas leading to certain possibilities or impossibilities
of aggregation. This approach was introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2002) in
related work on strategy-proof social choice and subsequently applied throughout
binary judgment-aggregation theory. One of our contributions is to show how it
can be applied in the area of probabilistic opinion pooling.
We conclude by comparing our results with their analogues in binary judgment-
aggregation theory and in Arrovian preference aggregation theory. Interestingly,
the conditions leading to linear pooling in probability aggregation correspond
exactly to the conditions leading to a dictatorship of one individual in both binary
judgment aggregation and Arrovian judgment aggregation. This yields a new
unied perspective on several at rst sight disparate aggregation problems.
2 The framework
We consider a group of n  2 individuals, labelled i = 1; :::; n, who have to assign
collective probabilities to some events.
The agenda. Let 
 be a non-empty set of possible worlds (or states). An
event is a subset A of 
; its complement (negation) is denoted Ac := 
nA. The
agenda is the set of events to which probabilities are assigned. Traditionally, the
agenda has been assumed to be a -algebra (i.e., closed under complementation
and countable union, and thereby also under countable intersection). Here, we
drop that assumption. As already noted, we may exclude some events from the
agenda, either because they are of no interest, or because no probability assign-
ments are available for them. For example, the agenda may contain the events
that global warming will continue, that interest rates will remain low, and that the
UK will remain in the European Union, but not the disjunction of these events.
Formally, we dene an agenda as a non-empty set X of events which is closed
under complementation, i.e., A 2 X ) Ac 2 X. Examples are X = fA;Acg or
X = fA;Ac; B;Bcg, where A and B may or may not be logically related.
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An example of an agenda without conjunctions or disjunctions. Sup-
pose each possible world is a vector of three binary characteristics. The rst takes
the value 1 if atmospheric CO2 is above some threshold, and 0 otherwise. The sec-
ond takes the value 1 if there is a mechanism to the e¤ect that if atmospheric CO2
is above that threshold, then Arctic summers are ice-free, and 0 otherwise. The
third takes the value 1 if Arctic summers are ice-free, and 0 otherwise. Thus the
set of possible worlds is the set of all triples of 0s and 1s, excluding the inconsistent
triple in which the rst and second characteristics are 1 and the third is 0, i.e.,

 = f0; 1g3nf(1; 1; 0)g. We now dene an agenda X consisting of A;A ! B;B,
and their complements, where A is the event of a positive rst characteristic,
A! B the event of a positive second characteristic, and B the event of a positive
third characteristic. (We use the sentential notation A! Bfor better readabil-
ity; formally, each of A, B, and A ! B are subsets of 
.3) Although there are
some logical connections between these events (in particular, A and A ! B are
inconsistent with Bc), the set X contains no conjunctions or disjunctions.
Probabilistic opinions. We begin with the notion of a probability function.
The classical focus on agendas that are -algebras is motivated by the fact that
such functions are dened on -algebras. Formally, a probability function on a -
algebra  is a function P : ! [0; 1] such that P (
) = 1 and P is -additive (i.e.,
P (A1[A2[ :::) = P (A1)+P (A2)+ ::: for every sequence of pairwise disjoint events
A1; A2; ::: 2 ). In the context of an arbitrary agenda X, we speak of opinion
functionsrather than probability functions. Formally, an opinion function for
an agenda X is a function P : X ! [0; 1] which is probabilistically coherent, i.e.,
extendable to a probability function on the -algebra generated by X. This -
algebra is denoted (X) and dened as the smallest -algebra that includes X. It
can be constructed by closingX under countable unions and complements.4 In our
expert-committee example, we have (X) = 2
, and an opinion function cannot
assign probability 1 to all of A, A ! B, and Bc. (This would not be extendable
to a well-dened probability function on 2
, given that A \ (A! B) \ Bc = ?.)
We write PX to denote the set of all opinion functions for the agenda X. If X is
a -algebra, PX is the set of all probability functions on it.
3Note that A! B (if A then B) is best interpreted as a non-material conditional, since its
negation, unlike that of a material conditional, is consistent with the negation of its antecedent,
A (i.e., Ac \ (A ! B)c 6= ?). (A material conditional is always true when its antecedent is
false.) The only assignment of truth-values to the events A, A ! B, and B that is ruled out
is (1; 1; 0). If we wanted to re-interpret ! as a material conditional, we would have to rule out
in addition the truth-value assignments (0; 0; 0), (0; 0; 1), and (1; 0; 1), which would make little
sense in the present example. The event A! B would become Ac [ B (= (A \ Bc)c), and the
agenda would no longer be free from conjunctions or disjunctions. However, the agenda would
still not be a -algebra. For a discussion of non-material conditionals, see, e.g., Priest (2001).
4Whenever X contains A and B, then (X) contains A[B, (A[B)c, (A[B)c [B, and so
on. In some cases, all events may be constructible from events in X, so that (X) = 2
.
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Opinion pooling. Given the agenda X, a combination of opinion functions
across the n individuals, (P1; :::; Pn), is called a prole (of opinion functions). An
(opinion) pooling function is a function F : PnX ! PX , which assigns to each
prole (P1; :::; Pn) a collective opinion function P = F (P1; :::; Pn), also denoted
PP1;:::;Pn. For instance, PP1;:::;Pn could be the arithmetic average
1
n
P1 + :::+
1
n
Pn.
Linearity and neutrality. A pooling function is linear if there exist real-
valued weights w1; :::; wn  0 with w1 + ::: + wn = 1 such that, for every prole
(P1; :::; Pn) 2 PnX ,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) =
nX
i=1
wiPi(A) for all A 2 X.
If wi = 1 for some expert i, we obtain an expert rule given by PP1;:::;Pn = Pi.
More generally, a pooling function is neutral if there exists some function D :
[0; 1]n ! [0; 1] such that, for every prole (P1; :::; Pn) 2 PnX ,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = D(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) for all A 2 X: (1)
We call D the local pooling criterion. Since it does not depend on the event A,
all events are treated equally (neutrality). Linearity is the special case in which
D is a weighted linear averaging criterion of the form D(x) =
Xn
i=1
wixi for all
x 2 [0; 1]n. Note that, while every combination of weights w1; :::; wn  0 with sum-
total 1 denes a proper linear pooling function (since linear averaging preserves
probabilistic coherence), a given non-linear function D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] might not
dene a proper pooling function. Formula (1) might not yield a well-dened i.e.,
probabilistically coherent opinion function. We will show that whether there can
be neutral but non-linear pooling functions depends on the agenda in question. If
the agenda is a -algebra, the answer is known to be negative (assuming jXj > 4).
However, we will also identify agendas for which the answer is positive.
Some logical terminology. An event A is contingent if it is neither the empty
set ? (impossible) nor the universal set 
 (necessary). A set S of events is
consistent if its intersection \A2SA is non-empty, and inconsistent otherwise. A
set S of events entails another event B if the intersection of S is included in B
(i.e., \A2SA  B).
Two kinds of applications. It is useful to distinguish between two kinds of
applications of probabilistic opinion pooling. We may be interested in either of
the following:
(a) the probabilities of certain propositions expressed in natural language, such
as it will rain tomorrowor the new legislation will be repealed;
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(b) the distribution of some real-valued (or vector-valued) random variable, such
as the number of insurance claims over a given period, or tomorrows price
of a given share, or the weight of a randomly picked potato from some farm.
Arguably, probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas is more relevant to
applications of type (a) than to applications of type (b). An application of type
(a) typically gives rise to an agenda expressible in natural language which does
not constitute a -algebra. It is then implausible to replace X with the -algebra
(X), many elements of which represent unduly complex combinations of other
events. Further, even when (X) is nite, it may be enormous. If X contains at
least k logically independent events, then (X) contains at least 22
k
events, so its
size grows double-exponentially in k.5 This suggests that, unless k is small, (X)
may be too large to serve as an agenda in practice. By contrast, an application of
type (b) plausibly gives rise to an agenda that is a -algebra. Here, the decision
makers may need a full probability distribution over the -algebra, and they may
also be able to specify such a distribution. For instance, a market analyst esti-
mating next months distribution of Apples share price might decide to specify
a log-normal distribution. This, in turn, requires the specication of only two
parameters: the mean and the variance of the exponential of the share price. We
discuss opinion pooling problems of type (b) in a companion paper (Dietrich and
List 2014), where they are one of our principal applications.
3 Axiomatic requirements on opinion pooling
We now introduce some requirements on opinion pooling functions.
3.1 The independence requirement
Our rst requirement, familiar from the literature, says that the collective prob-
ability of each event in the agenda should depend only on the individual proba-
bilities of that event. This requirement is sometimes also called the weak setwise
function property.
Independence. For each event A 2 X, there exists a function DA : [0; 1]n !
[0; 1] (the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX ,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)):
One justication for independence is the Condorcetian idea that the collective
view on any issue should depend only on individual views on that issue. This
5For instance, if X contains k = 2 logically independent events, say A and B, then X includes
a partition A of 
 into 2k = 4 non-empty events, namely A = fA\B;A\Bc; Ac \B;Ac \Bcg,
and hence X includes the set f[C2CC : C  Ag containing 22k = 16 events.
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reects a local, rather than holistic, understanding of aggregation. (On a holistic
understanding, the collective view on an issue may be inuenced by individual
views on other issues.) Independence, understood in this way, becomes less com-
pelling if the agenda contains articialevents, such as conjunctions of intuitively
unrelated events, as in the case of a -algebra. It would be implausible, for in-
stance, to disregard the individual probabilities assigned to a blizzardand to
an interest-rate increasewhen determining the collective probability of the dis-
junction of these events. Here, however, we focus on general agendas, where the
Condorcetian justication for independence is more plausible.
There are also two pragmatic justications for independence; these apply even
when the agenda is a -algebra. First, aggregating probabilities issue-by-issue
is informationally and computationally less demanding than a holistic approach
and thus easier to implement in practice. Second, independence prevents certain
types of agenda manipulation the attempt by an agenda setter to inuence the
collective probability assigned to some events by adding other events to, or remov-
ing them from, the agenda.6 Nonetheless, independence should not be accepted
uncritically, since it is vulnerable to a number of well-known objections.7
3.2 The consensus-preservation requirement
Our next requirement says that if all individuals assign probability 1 (certainty)
to an event in the agenda, then its collective probability should also be 1.
Consensus preservation. For all A 2 X and all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , if, for all i,
Pi(A) = 1, then PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1.
Like independence, this requirement is familiar from the literature, where it
is sometimes expressed as a zero-probability preservation requirement. In the
case of general agendas, we can also formulate several strengthened variants of
the requirement, which extend it to other forms of consensus. Although these
variants are not as compelling as their original precursor, they are still defensible
in some cases. Moreover, when the agenda is a -algebra, they all collapse back
into consensus preservation in its original form.
6When X is a -algebra, McConway (1981) shows that independence (his weak setwise func-
tion property) is equivalent to the marginalization property, which requires aggregation to com-
mute with the operation of reducing the -algebra to some sub--algebra   X. A similar
result holds for general agendas X.
7When the agenda is a -algebra, independence conicts with the preservation of unanimously
held judgments of probabilistic independence, assuming non-dictatorial aggregation (Genest and
Wagner 1987; Bradley, Dietrich, and List 2014). Whether this objection also applies in the
case of general agendas depends on the precise nature of the agenda. Another objection is
that independence is not generally compatible with external Bayesianity, the requirement that
aggregation commute with Bayesian updating of probabilities in light of new information.
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To introduce the di¤erent extensions of consensus preservation, we begin by
drawing a distinction between explicitly revealed, implicitly revealed, and un-
revealedbeliefs:
 Individual is explicitly revealed beliefs are the probabilities assigned to
events in the agenda X by the opinion function Pi.
 Individual is implicitly revealed beliefs are the probabilities assigned to any
events in (X)nX by every probability function on (X) extending the opin-
ion function Pi; we call such a probability function an extension of Pi and
use the notation P i. These probabilities are impliedby the opinion func-
tion Pi. For instance, if Pi assigns probability 1 to an event A in the agenda
X, this impliesan assignment of probability 1 to all events B outside the
agenda that are of the form B  A.
 Individual is unrevealed beliefs are probabilities for events in (X)nX that
cannot be deduced from the opinion function Pi. These are only privately
held. For instance, the opinion function Pi may admit extensions which
assign probability 1 to an event B but may also admit extensions which
assign a lower probability. Here, individual is belief about B is unrevealed.
Consensus preservation in its original form concerns only explicitly revealed
beliefs. The rst strengthened variant extends the requirement to implicitly re-
vealed beliefs. Let us say that an opinion function P on X implies certainty of
an event A if P (A) = 1 for every extension P of P .
Implicit consensus preservation. For all A 2 (X) and all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX ,
if, for all i, Pi implies certainty of A, then PP1;:::;Pn also implies certainty of A.
This ensures that whenever all individuals either explicitly or implicitly assign
probability 1 to some event, this is preserved at the collective level. Arguably, this
requirement is almost as plausible as consensus preservation in its original form.
The second extension concerns unrevealed beliefs. Informally, it says that a
unanimous assignment of probability 1 to some event should never be overruled,
even if it is unrevealed. This is operationalized as the requirement that if every
individuals opinion function is consistent with the assignment of probability 1
to some event (so that we cannot rule out the possibility of the individualspri-
vately making that assignment), then the collective opinion function should also
be consistent with it. Formally, we say that an opinion function P on X is con-
sistent with certainty of an event A if there exists some extension P of P such
that P (A) = 1.
Consensus compatibility. For all A 2 (X) and all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , if, for all i,
Pi is consistent with certainty of A, then PP1;:::;Pn is also consistent with certainty
of A.
The rationale for this requirement is a precautionary one: if it is possible that
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all individuals assign probability 1 to some event (though this may be unrevealed),
the collective opinion function should not rule out certainty of A.
A third extension of consensus preservation concerns conditional beliefs. It
looks more complicated than consensus compatibility, but it is less demanding.
Its initial motivation is the idea that if all individuals are certain of some event
in the agenda conditional on another event, then this conditional belief should
be preserved collectively. For instance, if everyone is certain that there will be a
famine, given a civil war, this belief should also be held collectively. Unfortunately,
however, we cannot dene individual is conditional probability of an event A,
given another event B, simply as Pi(AjB) = Pi(A \ B)=Pi(B) (where Pi(B) 6= 0
and Pi is individual is opinion function). This is because, even when A and B
are in X, the event A \ B may be outside X and thus outside the domain of Pi.
So, we cannot know whether the individual is certain of A given B. But we can
ask whether he or she could be certain of A given B, i.e., whether P i(AjB) = 1
for some extension P of P .
This motivates the requirement that if each individual could be certain of A
given B, then the collective opinion function should also be consistent with this
conditional certainty. Again, this can be interpreted as requiring the preservation
of certain unrevealed beliefs. A unanimous assignment of conditional probability
1 to one event, given another, should not be overruled, even if it is unrevealed.
We capture this in the following way. Suppose there is a nite set of pairs
of events in X call them (A;B), (A0; B0), (A00; B00), and so on such that each
individual could be simultaneously certain of A given B, of A0 given B0, of A00
given B00, and so on. Then the collective opinion function should also be consistent
with conditional certainty of A given B, A0 given B0, and so on. Formally, for any
nite set S of pairs (A;B) of events in X, we say that an opinion function P on
X is consistent with conditional certainty of all (A;B) in S if there exists some
extension P of P such that P (AjB) = 1 for all (A;B) in S for which P (B) 6= 0.
Conditional consensus compatibility. For all nite sets S of pairs of events in
X and all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , if, for all i, Pi is consistent with conditional certainty
of all (A;B) in S, then PP1;:::;Pn is also consistent with conditional certainty of all
(A;B) in S.
The following proposition summarizes the logical relationships between the
di¤erent consensus-preservation requirements; a proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 (a) Consensus preservation is implied by each of (i) implicit con-
sensus preservation, (ii) consensus compatibility, and (iii) conditional con-
sensus compatibility, and is equivalent to each of (i), (ii), and (iii) if the
agenda X is a -algebra.
(b) Consensus compatibility implies conditional consensus compatibility.
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Each of our characterization results below uses consensus preservation in either
its original form or one of the strengthened forms. Implicit consensus preservation
does not appear in any of our results; we have included it here for the sake of
conceptual completeness.8
4 When is opinion pooling neutral?
We now show that, for many agendas, the neutral pooling functions are the only
pooling functions satisfying independence and consensus preservation in either
its original form or one of the strengthened forms. The stronger the consensus-
preservation requirement, the larger the class of agendas for which our charac-
terization of neutral pooling holds. For the moment, we set aside the question
of whether independence and consensus preservation imply linearity as well as
neutrality; we address this question in the next section.
4.1 Three theorems
We begin with the strongest of our consensus-preservation requirements, i.e., con-
sensus compatibility. If we impose this requirement, our characterization of neu-
tral pooling holds for a very large class of agendas: all non-nested agendas. We
call an agenda X nested if it has the form X = fA;Ac : A 2 X+g for some
set X+ ( X) that is linearly ordered by set-inclusion, and non-nested other-
wise. For example, binary agendas of the form X = fA;Acg are nested: take
X+ := fAg, which is trivially linearly ordered by set-inclusion. Also, the agenda
X = f( 1; t]; (t;1) : t 2 Rg (where the set of possible worlds is 
 = R) is
nested: take X+ := f( 1; t] : t 2 Rg, which is linearly ordered by set-inclusion.
By contrast, any agenda consisting of multiple logically independent pairs
A;Ac is non-nested, i.e., X is non-nested if X = fAk; Ack : k 2 Kg with jKj  2
such that every subset S  X containing precisely one member of each pair
fAk; Ackg (with k 2 K) is consistent. As mentioned in the introduction, such agen-
das are of practical importance because many decision problems involve events
that exhibit only probabilistic dependencies (correlations), but no logical ones.
Another example of a non-nested agenda is the one in the expert-committee ex-
ample above, containing A, A! B, B, and their complements.
Theorem 1 (a) For any non-nested agenda X, every pooling function F : PnX !
PX satisfying independence and consensus compatibility is neutral.
8An interesting fourth variant is the requirement obtained by combining the antecedent of
implicit consensus preservation with the conclusion of consensus compatibility. This condition
weakens both implicit consensus preservation and consensus compatibility, while still strength-
ening the initial consensus preservation requirement.
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(b) For any nested agenda X ( 6= f?;
g), there exists a non-neutral pooling
function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus compatibility.
Part (b) shows that the agenda condition used in part (a) non-nestedness
is tight: whenever the agenda is nested, non-neutral pooling functions become
possible. However, these pooling functions are non-neutral only in a limited sense:
although the pooling criterion DA need not be the same for all events A 2 X,
it must still be the same for all A 2 X+, and the same for all A 2 XnX+ (with
X+ as dened above), so that pooling is neutral within X+and neutral within
XnX+. This is clear from the proof.9
What happens if we weaken the requirement of consensus compatibility to
conditional consensus compatibility? Both parts of Theorem 1 continue to hold,
though part (a) becomes logically stronger, and part (b) logically weaker. Let us
state the modied theorem explicitly:
Theorem 2 (a) For any non-nested agenda X, every pooling function F : PnX !
PX satisfying independence and conditional consensus compatibility is neu-
tral.
(b) For any nested agenda X ( 6= f?;
g), there exists a non-neutral pooling
function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and conditional consensus
compatibility.
The situation changes once we weaken the consensus requirement further,
namely to consensus preservation simpliciter. The class of agendas for which
our characterization of neutrality holds shrinks signicantly, namely to the class
of path-connected agendas. Path-connectedness is an important condition in
judgment-aggregation theory, where it was introduced by Nehring and Puppe
(2010) (under the name total blockedness) and has been used, for example, to
generalize Arrows theorem (Dietrich and List 2007a, Dokow and Holzman 2010).
To dene path-connectedness, we require one preliminary denition. Given
an agenda X, we say that an event A 2 X conditionally entails another event
B 2 X, written A ` B, if there exists a subset Y  X (possibly empty, but
not uncountably innite) such that fAg [ Y entails B, where, for non-triviality,
Y [fAg and Y [fBcg are each consistent. For instance, if ? 6= A  B 6= 
, then
A ` B (take Y = ?; in fact, this is even an unconditional entailment). Also, for
the agenda of our expert committee, X = fA;Ac; A ! B; (A ! B)c; B;Bcg, we
have A ` B (take Y = fA! Bg).
We call an agenda X path-connected if any two events A;B 2 Xnf?;
g
can be connected by a path of conditional entailments, i.e., there exist events
A1; :::; Ak 2 X (k  1) such that A = A1 ` A2 ` ::: ` Ak = B. An example of
9As a consequence, full neutrality follows even for nested agendas if independence is slightly
strengthened by requiring that DA = DAc for some A 2 Xnf?;
g.
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a path-connected agenda is X := fA;Ac : A  R is a bounded intervalg, where
the underlying set of worlds is 
 = R. For instance, there is a path of conditional
entailments from [0; 1] 2 X to [2; 3] 2 X given by [0; 1] ` [0; 3] ` [2; 3]. To
establish [0; 1] ` [0; 3], it su¢ ces to conditionalize on the empty set of events
Y = ? (i.e., [0; 1] even unconditionally entails [0; 3]). To establish [0; 3] ` [2; 3],
one may conditionalize on Y = f[2; 4]g.
Many agendas are not path-connected, including all nested agendas (6= f?;
g)
and the agenda in our expert-committee example. The following result holds.
Theorem 3 (a) For any path-connected agenda X, every pooling function F :
PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus preservation is neutral.
(b) For any non-path-connected agenda X (nite and distinct from f?;
g),
there exists a non-neutral pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying inde-
pendence and consensus preservation.
4.2 Proof sketches
We now outline the proofs of Theorems 1 to 3. (Details are given in the Appendix.)
We begin with part (a) of each theorem. Theorem 1(a) follows from Theorem 2(a),
since both results apply to the same agendas but Theorem 1(a) uses a stronger
consensus requirement.
To prove Theorem 2(a), we dene a binary relation  on the set of all con-
tingent events in the agenda. Recall that two events A and B are exclusive if
A \B = ? and exhaustive if A [B = 
. For any A;B 2 Xnf?;
g, we dene
A  B ,
there is a nite sequence A1; :::; Ak 2 X of length k  1 with A1 = A
and Ak = B such that any adjacentAj; Aj+1 are neither exclusive nor
exhaustive.
Theorem 2(a) then follows immediately from the following two lemmas (proved
in the Appendix).
Lemma 1 For any agenda X (6= f?;
g), the relation  is an equivalence rela-
tion on Xnf?;
g, with exactly two equivalence classes if X is nested, and exactly
one if X is non-nested.
Lemma 2 For any agenda X (6= f?;
g), a pooling function satisfying indepen-
dence and conditional consensus compatibility is neutral on each equivalence class
with respect to  (i.e., the local pooling criterion is the same for all events in the
same equivalence class).
The proof of Theorem 3(a) uses the following lemma (broadly analogous to a
lemma in binary judgment-aggregation theory; e.g., Nehring and Puppe 2010 and
Dietrich and List 2007a).
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Lemma 3 For any pooling function satisfying independence and consensus preser-
vation, and all events A and B in the agenda X, if A ` B then DA  DB, where
DA andDB are the local pooling criteria for A and B, respectively. (HereDA  DB
means that, for all (p1; :::; pn), DA(p1; :::; pn)  DB(p1; :::; pn).)
To see why Theorem 3(a) follows, simply note thatDA  DB whenever there is
a path of conditional entailments from A 2 X to B 2 X (by repeated application
of the lemma); thus, DA = DB whenever there are paths in both directions, as is
guaranteed if the agenda is path-connected and A;B 62 f?;
g.
Part (b) of each theorem can be proved by explicitly constructing a non-
neutral pooling function  for an agenda of the relevant kind which satises
independence and the appropriate consensus-preservation requirement. In the
case of Theorem 3(b), this pooling function is very complex, and hence we omit
it in the main text. In the case of Theorems 1(a) and 1(b), the idea can be
described informally. Recall that a nested agenda X can be partitioned into two
subsets, X+ and XnX+ = fAc : A 2 X+g, each of which is linearly ordered by
set-inclusion. The opinion pooling function constructed has the property that (i)
all events A in X+ have the same local pooling criterion D = DA, which can be
dened, for example, as the square of a linear pooling criterion (i.e., we rst apply
a linear pooling criterion and then take the square), and (ii) all events in XnX+
have the same complementarypooling criterion D, dened as D(x1; :::; xn) =
1   D(1   x1; :::; 1   xn) for all (x1; :::; xn) 2 [0; 1]n. Showing that the resulting
pooling function is well-dened and satises all the relevant requirements involves
some technicality, in part because we allow the agenda to have any cardinality.
5 When is opinion pooling linear?
As we have seen, for many agendas, only neutral pooling functions can satisfy our
two requirements. But are these functions also linear? As we now show, the answer
depends on the agenda. If we suitably restrict the class of agendas considered in
part (a) of each of our previous theorems, we can derive linearity rather than just
neutrality. Similarly, we can expand the class of agendas considered in part (b)
of each theorem, and replace non-neutrality with non-linearity.
5.1 Three theorems
As in the previous section, we begin with the strongest consensus-preservation
requirement, i.e., consensus compatibility. While this requirement leads to neu-
trality for all non-nested agendas (by Theorem 1), it leads to linearity for all
non-nested agendas above a certain size.
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Theorem 4 (a) For any non-nested agenda X with jXnf
;?gj > 4, every pool-
ing function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus compati-
bility is linear.
(b) For any other agenda X ( 6= f?;
g), there exists a non-linear pooling func-
tion F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus compatibility.
Next, let us weaken the requirement of consensus compatibility to conditional
consensus compatibility. While this requirement leads to neutrality for all non-
nested agendas (by Theorem 2), it leads to linearity only for non-simple agendas.
Like path-connected agendas, non-simple agendas play an important role in binary
judgment-aggregation theory, where they are the agendas susceptible to the ana-
logues of Condorcets paradox: the possibility of inconsistent majority judgments
(e.g., Dietrich and List 2007b, Nehring and Puppe 2007).
To dene non-simplicity, we rst require a preliminary denition. We call a set
of events Y minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent but every proper subset Y 0 (
Y is consistent. Examples of minimal inconsistent sets are (i) fA;B; (A \ B)cg,
where A and B are logically independent events, and (ii) fA;A! B;Bcg, with A,
B, and A ! B as dened in the expert-committee example above. In each case,
the three events are mutually inconsistent, but any two of them are mutually con-
sistent. The notion of a minimal inconsistent set is useful for characterizing logical
dependencies between the events in the agenda. Trivial examples of minimal in-
consistent subsets of the agenda are those of the form fA;Acg  X, where A is
contingent. But many interesting agendas have more complex minimal inconsis-
tent subsets. One may regard supYX:Y is minimal inconsistent jY j as a measure of the
complexity of the logical dependencies in the agenda X. Given this idea, we call
an agenda X non-simple if it has at least one minimal inconsistent subset Y  X
containing more than two (but not uncountably many10) events, and simple other-
wise. For instance, the agenda consisting of A, A! B, B and their complements
in our expert-committee example is non-simple (take Y = fA;A! B;Bcg).
Non-simplicity lies logically between non-nestedness and path-connectedness:
it implies non-nestedness, and is implied by path-connectedness (ifX 6= f
;?g).11
10This countability addition can often be dropped because all minimal inconsistent sets Y  X
are automatically nite or at least countable. This is so if X is nite or countably innite, and
also if the underlying set of worlds 
 is countable. It can further be dropped in case the events
in X are represented by sentences in a language. Then, provided this language belongs to a
compact logic, all minimal inconsistent sets Y  X are nite (because any inconsistent set has
a nite inconsistent subset). By contrast, if X is a -algebra and has innite cardinality, then
it usually contains events not representing sentences, because countably innite disjunctions
cannot be formed in a language. Such agendas often have uncountable minimal inconsistent
subsets. For instance, if X is the -algebra of Borel-measurable subsets of R, then its subset
Y = fRnfxg : x 2 Rg is uncountable and minimal inconsistent. This agenda is nonetheless
non-simple, since it also has many nite minimal inconsistent subsets Y with jY j  3 (e.g.,
Y = ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2; 3gg).
11To give an example of a non-nested but simple agenda X, let X = fA;Ac; B;Bcg, where the
events A and B are logically independent, i.e., A\B;A\Bc; Ac \B;Ac \Bc 6= ?. Clearly, this
15
To see how exactly non-simplicity strengthens non-nestedness, note the following
fact (Dietrich 2013):
Fact (a) An agenda X (with jXnf
;?gj > 4) is non-nested if and only if it has
at least one subset Y with jY j  3 such that (Y nfAg) [ fAcg is consistent
for each A 2 Y .
(b) An agenda X (with jXnf
;?gj > 4) is non-simple if and only if it has at
least one inconsistent subset Y (of countable size) with jY j  3 such that
(Y nfAg) [ fAcg is consistent for each A 2 Y .
Note that the characterizing condition in (b) can be obtained from the one in
(a) simply by replacing subset Y with inconsistent subset Y (of countable size).
Theorem 5 (a) For any non-simple agenda X with jXnf
;?gj > 4, every pool-
ing function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and conditional consen-
sus compatibility is linear.
(b) For any simple agenda X (nite and distinct from f?;
g), there exists
a non-linear pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and
conditional consensus compatibility.
Finally, we turn to the least demanding consensus requirement, namely consen-
sus preservation simpliciter. We have seen that this requirement leads to neutral
pooling if the agenda is path-connected (by Theorem 3). To obtain a characteri-
zation of linear pooling, path-connectedness alone is not enough. In the following
theorem, we impose an additional condition on the agenda. We call an agenda X
partitional if it has a subset Y which partitions 
 into at least three non-empty
events (where Y is nite or countably innite), and non-partitional otherwise.
(A subset Y of X partitions 
 if the elements of Y are individually non-empty,
pairwise disjoint, and cover 
.) For instance, X is partitional if it contains (non-
empty) events A, Ac \B, and Ac \Bc; simply let Y = fA;Ac \B;Ac \Bcg.
Theorem 6 (a) For any path-connected and partitional agenda X, every pooling
function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus preservation
is linear.
(b) For any non-path-connected (nite) agenda X, there exists a non-linear pool-
ing function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus preserva-
tion.
agenda is non-nested. It is simple since its only minimal inconsistent subsets are fA;Acg and
fB;Bcg. To give an example of a non-path-connected, but non-simple agenda, let X consist of
A;A! B;B and their complements, as in our example above. We have already observed that
it is non-simple. To see that it is not path-connected, note, for example, that there is no path
of conditional entailments from B to BC .
16
Part (b) shows that one of theorems agenda conditions, path-connectedness,
is necessary for the characterization of linear pooling (which is unsurprising, as it
is necessary for the characterization of neutral pooling). By contrast, the other
agenda condition, partitionality, is not necessary: linearity also follows from inde-
pendence and consensus preservation for some non-partitional but path-connected
agendas. So, the agenda conditions of part (a) are non-minimal. We leave the
task of nding minimal agenda conditions as a challenge for future research.12
Despite its non-minimality, the partionality condition in Theorem 6 is not
redundant: if it were dropped (and not replaced by something else), part (a)
would cease to hold. This follows from the following (non-trivial) proposition:
Proposition 2 For some path-connected and non-partitional (nite) agenda X,
there exists a non-linear pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence
(even neutrality) and consensus preservation.13
Readers familiar with binary judgment-aggregation theory will notice that the
agenda which we construct to prove this proposition violates an important agenda
condition from that area, namely even-number negatability (or
non-a¢ neness) (see Dietrich 2007, Dietrich and List 2007, Dokow and Holzman
2010). It would be intriguing if the same condition turned out to be the correct
minimal substitute for partionality in Theorem 6.
5.2 Proof sketches
We now describe how Theorems 4 to 6 can be proved. (Again, details are given in
the Appendix.) We begin with part (a) of each theorem. To prove Theorem 4(a),
consider a non-nested agenda X with jXnf
;?gj > 4 and a pooling function F
satisfying independence and consensus compatibility. We want to show that F
is linear. Neutrality follows from Theorem 1(a). From neutrality, we can infer
linearity by using two lemmas. The rst contains the bulk of the work, and the
second is an application of Cauchys functional equation (similar to its application
in Aczél and Wagner 1980 and McConway 1981). Let us write 0 and 1 to denote
the n-tuples (0; :::; 0) and (1; :::; 1), respectively.
Lemma 4 If D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neutral and
consensus-compatible pooling function for a non-nested agenda X with
12A generalized denition of partitionality is possible in Theorem 6: we could dene X to be
partitional if there are nite or countably innite subsets Y; Z  X such that the set fA \ C :
A 2 Y g, with C = \B2ZB, partitions C into at least three non-empty events. This denition
generalizes the one in the main text, because if we take Z = ?, then C becomes 
 (= \B2?B)
and Y simply partitions 
. But since we do not know whether this generalized denition renders
partitionality logically minimal in Theorem 6, we use the simpler denition in the main text.
13In this proposition, we assume that the underlying set of worlds 
 satises j
j  4.
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jXnf
;?gj > 4, then
D(x) +D(y) +D(z) = 1 for all x; y; z 2 [0; 1]n with x+ y + z = 1. (2)
Lemma 5 If a function D : [0; 1n] ! [0; 1] with D(0) = 0 satises (2), then it
takes the linear form
D(x1; :::; xn) =
nX
i=1
wixi for all x 2 [0; 1]n
for some non-negative weights w1; :::; wn with sum 1.
The proof of Theorem 5(a) follows a similar strategy, but replaces Lemma 4
with the following lemma:
Lemma 6 If D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neutral and
conditional-consensus-compatible pooling function for a non-simple agenda X,
then (2) holds.
Finally, Theorem 6(a) can also be proved using a similar strategy, this time
replacing Lemma 4 with the following lemma:
Lemma 7 If D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neutral and
consensus-preserving pooling function for a partitional agenda X, then (2) holds.
Part (b) of each of Theorems 4 to 6 can be proved by constructing a suitable
example of a non-linear pooling function. In the case of Theorem 4(b), we can
re-use the non-neutral pooling function constructed to prove Theorem 1(b) as long
as the agenda satises jXnf
;?gj > 4; for (small) agendas with jXnf
;?gj  4,
we construct a somewhat simplistic pooling function generating collective opin-
ion functions that only assign probabilities of 0, 1
2
, or 1. The constructions for
Theorems 5(b) and 6(b) are more di¢ cult; the one for Theorem 5(b) also has the
property that collective probabilities never take values other than 0, 1
2
, or 1.
6 Classic results as special cases
It is instructive to see how our present results generalize classic results in the
literature, where the agenda is a -algebra (especially Aczél and Wagner 1980
and McConway 1981). Note that, for a -algebra, all the agenda conditions we
have used reduce to a simple condition on agenda size:
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Lemma 8 For any agenda X (6= f
;?g) that is closed under pairwise union or
intersection (i.e., any agenda that is an algebra), the conditions of non-nestedness,
non-simplicity, path-connectedness, and partitionality are equivalent, and are each
satised if and only if jXj > 4.
Note, further, that when X is a -algebra, all of our consensus requirements
become equivalent, as shown by Proposition 1(a). It follows that, in the special
case of a -algebra, our six theorems reduce to two classical results:
 Theorems 1 to 3 reduce to the result that all pooling functions satisfying
independence and consensus preservation are neutral if jXj > 4, but not if
jXj = 4;
 Theorems 4 to 6 reduce to the result that all pooling functions satisfying
independence and consensus preservation are linear if jXj > 4, but not if
jXj = 4.
The case jXj < 4 is uninteresting because it implies that X = f?;
g, given
that X is a -algebra. In fact, we can derive these classic theorems not only for
-algebras, but also for algebras. This is because, given Lemma 8, Theorems 3
and 6 have the following implication:
Corollary 1 For any agenda X that is closed under pairwise union or intersec-
tion (i.e., any agenda that is an algebra),
(a) if jXj > 4, every pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence
and consensus preservation is linear (and by implication neutral);
(b) if jXj = 4, there exists a non-neutral (and by implication non-linear) pooling
function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus preservation.
7 Probabilistic preference aggregation
To illustrate the use of general agendas, we now present an application to proba-
bilistic preference aggregation, a probabilistic analogue of Arrovian preference ag-
gregation. A group seeks to rank a set K of at least two (mutually exclusive and
exhaustive) alternatives in a linear order. Let 
K be the set of all strict orderings
 over K (asymmetric, transitive, and connected binary relations). Informally,
K can represent any set of distinct objects, e.g., policy options, candidates, social
states, or distributions of goods, and an ordering  over K can have any inter-
pretation consistent with a linear form (e.g., better than, preferable to, higher
than, more competent than, less unequal thanetc.).
For any two distinct alternatives x and y in K, let x  y denote the event that
x is ranked above y; i.e., x  y denotes the subset of 
K consisting of all those
orderings  in 
K such that x  y. We dene the preference agenda as the set
XK = fx  y : x; y 2 K with x 6= yg;
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which is non-empty and closed under complementation, as required for an agenda
(this construction draws on Dietrich and List 2007a). In our opinion pooling
problem, each individual i submits probability assignments for the events in XK ,
and the group then determines corresponding collective probability assignments.
An agents opinion function P : XK ! [0; 1] can be interpreted as capturing the
agents degrees of belief about which of the various pairwise comparisons x  y
(in XK) are correct; call this the belief interpretation. Thus, for any two distinct
alternatives x and y in K, P (x  y) can be interpreted as the agents degree
of belief in the event x  y, i.e., the event that x is ranked above (preferable
to, better than, higher than ...) y. (On a di¤erent interpretation, the vague-
preference interpretation, P (x  y) could represent the degree to which the agent
prefers x to y, so that the present framework would capture vague preferences
over alternatives as opposed to degrees of belief about how they are ranked in
terms of the appropriate criterion.) A pooling function, as dened above, maps n
individual such opinion functions to a single collective one.
What are the structural properties of this preference agenda?
Lemma 9 For a preference agenda XK, the conditions of non-nestedness, non-
simplicity, and path-connectedness are equivalent, and are each satised if and
only if jKj > 2; the condition of partitionality is violated for any K.
The proof that the preference agenda is non-nested if and only if jKj > 2 is
trivial. The analogous claims for non-simplicity and path-connectedness are well-
established in binary judgment-aggregation theory, to which we refer the reader.14
Finally, it is easy to show that any preference agenda violates partitionality.
Since the preference agenda is non-nested, non-simple, and path-connected
when jKj > 2, Theorems 1(a), 2(a), 3(a), 4(a), and 5(a) apply; but Theorem 6(a)
does not, because partitionality is violated. Let us here focus on Theorem 5. This
theorem has the following corollary for the preference agenda:
Corollary 2 For a preference agenda XK,
(a) if jKj > 2, every pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence
and conditional consensus compatibility is linear;
(b) if jKj = 2, there exists a non-linear pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying
independence and conditional consensus compatibility.
It is interesting to compare this result with Arrows classic theorem. While
Arrows theorem yields a negative conclusion if jKj > 2 (showing that only dic-
tatorial aggregation functions satisfy its requirements), our linearity result does
14To see that XK is non-simple if jKj > 2, choose three distinct alternatives x; y; z 2 K and
note that the three events x  y; y  z; and z  x in XK are mutually inconsistent, but any
pair of them is consistent, so that they form a minimal inconsistent subset of XK .
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not have any negative avour. We obtain this positive result despite the fact that
our axiomatic requirements are comparable to Arrows. Independence, in our
framework, is the probabilistic analogue of Arrows independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives: for any pair of distinct alternatives x; y in K, the collective probability
for x  y should depend only on individual probabilities for x  y. Conditional
consensus compatibility is a strengthened analogue of Arrows weak Pareto prin-
ciple (an exact analogue would be consensus preservation): it requires that, for
any two pairs of distinct alternatives, x; y 2 K and v; w 2 K, if all individuals
are certain that x  y given that v  w, then this agreement should be preserved
at the collective level. The analogues of Arrows universal domain and collective
rationality are built into our denition of a pooling function, whose domain and
co-domain are dened as the set of all (by denition coherent) opinion functions
over XK .
Thus our result points towards an alternative escape-route from Arrows im-
possibility theorem (though it may be practically applicable only in special con-
texts): if we enrich Arrows informational framework by allowing degrees of belief
over di¤erent possible linear orderings as input and output of the aggregation (or
alternatively, vague preferences, understood probabilistically), then we can avoid
Arrows dictatorship conclusion. Instead, we obtain a positive characterization
of linear pooling, despite imposing requirements on the pooling function that are
stronger than Arrows classic requirements (in so far as conditional consensus
compatibility is stronger than the analogue of the weak Pareto principle).
On the belief interpretation, the present informational framework is meaningful
so long as there exists a fact of the matter about which of the orderings  in

K is the correct one (e.g., an objective quality ordering), so that it makes
sense to form beliefs about this fact. On the vague-preference interpretation, our
framework requires that vague preferences over pairs of alternatives are extendable
to a coherent probability distribution over the set of crisporderings  in 
K .
There are, of course, substantial bodies of literature on avoiding Arrows dic-
tatorship conclusion in richer informational frameworks and on probabilistic or
vague preference aggregation. It is well known, for example, that the introduc-
tion of interpersonally comparable preferences (of an ordinal or cardinal type) is
su¢ cient for avoiding Arrows negative conclusion (e.g., Sen 1970/1979). Also,
di¤erent models of probabilistic or vague preference aggregation have been pro-
posed.15 A typical assumption is that, for any pair of alternatives x; y 2 K, each
individual prefers x to y to a certain degree between 0 and 1. However, the stan-
dard constraints on vague or fuzzy preferences do not require individuals to hold
15A model in which individuals and the collective specify probabilities of selecting each of the
alternatives in K (as opposed to probability assignments over events of the form x is ranked
above y) has been studied, for instance, by Intriligator (1973), who has characterized a version
of linear averaging in it. Similarly, a model in which individuals have vague or fuzzy preferences
has been studied, for instance, by Billot (1991) and more recently by Piggins and Perote-Peña
(2007) (see also Sanver and Selçuk 2009).
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probabilistically coherent opinion functions in our sense; hence the literature has
tended to generate Arrow-style impossibility results. By contrast, it is illuminat-
ing to see that a possibility result on probabilistic preference aggregation can be
derived as a corollary of one of our new results on probabilistic opinion pooling.
8 A unied perspective
Finally, we wish to compare probabilistic opinion pooling with binary judgment
aggregation and Arrovian preference aggregation in its original form. Thanks to
the notion of a general agenda, we can represent each of these other aggregation
problems within the present framework.
 To represent binary judgment aggregation, we simply need to restrict at-
tention to binary opinion functions, i.e., opinion functions that take only
the values 0 and 1.16 Binary opinion functions correspond to consistent and
complete judgment sets in judgment-aggregation theory, i.e., sets of the form
J  X which satisfy \A2JA 6= ? (consistency) and contain a member of
each pair A;Ac 2 X (completeness).17 A binary opinion pooling function as-
signs to each prole of binary opinion functions a collective binary opinion
function. Thus, binary opinion pooling functions correspond to standard
judgment aggregation functions (with universal domain and consistent and
complete outputs).
 To represent preference aggregation, we need to restrict attention both to the
preference agenda, as introduced in Section 7, and to binary opinion func-
tions, as just dened. Binary opinion functions for the preference agenda
correspond to linear preference orders, as familiar from preference aggrega-
tion theory in the tradition of Arrow. Here, binary opinion pooling functions
correspond to Arrovian social welfare functions.
The literature on binary judgment aggregation contains several theorems that
use axiomatic requirements similar to those used here. In the binary case, how-
ever, these requirements lead to dictatorial, rather than linear, aggregation, as in
Arrows original impossibility theorem in preference-aggregation theory. In fact,
Arrow-like theorems are immediate corollaries of the results on judgment aggre-
gation, when applied to the preference agenda (e.g., Dietrich and List 2007a, List
and Pettit 2004). In particular, the independence requirement reduces to Arrows
independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the unanimity-preservation require-
ments reduce to variants of the Pareto principle.
16Formally, a binary opinion function is a function f : X ! f0; 1g that is extendible to a
probability function on (X), or equivalently, to a truth-function on (X) (i.e., a f0; 1g-valued
function on (X) that is logically consistent).
17Specically, a binary opinion function f : X ! f0; 1g corresponds to the consistent and
complete judgment set fA 2 X : f(A) = 1g.
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How can the same axiomatic requirements lead to a positive conclusion 
linearity in the probabilistic framework and to a negative one dictatorship 
in the binary case? The reason is that, in the binary case, linearity collapses into
dictatorship because the only well-dened linear pooling functions are dictatorial
here. Let us explain this point. Linearity of a binary opinion pooling function F
is dened just as in the probabilistic framework: there exist real-valued weights
w1; :::; wn  0 with w1 + ::: + wn = 1 such that, for every prole (P1; :::; Pn) of
binary opinion functions, the collective truth-value of any given event A in the
agenda X is the weighted arithmetic average w1P1(A) +    + wnPn(A). Yet, for
this to dene a proper binary opinion pooling function, some individual i must
get a weight of 1 and all others must get a weight of 0, since otherwise the average
w1P1(A) +   +wnPn(A) could fall strictly between 0 and 1, violating the binary
restriction. In other words, linearity is equivalent to dictatorship here.18
We can obtain a unied perspective on several distinct aggregation problems
by combining this papers linearity results with the corresponding dictatorship
results from the existing literature (adopting the unication strategy proposed
in Dietrich and List 2010). This yields several unied characterization theorems
applicable to probability aggregation, judgment aggregation, and preference ag-
gregation. Let us state these results. The rst combines Theorem 4 with a result
due to Dietrich (2013); the second combines Theorem 5 with a result due to Di-
etrich and List (2013); and the third combines Theorem 6 with the analogue of
Arrows theorem in judgment aggregation (Dietrich and List 2007a and Dokow
and Holzman 2010). In the binary case, the independence requirement and our
various unanimity requirements are dened as in the probabilistic framework, but
with a restriction to binary opinion functions.19
Theorem 4+ (a) For any non-nested agenda X with jXnf
;?gj > 4, every
binary or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence
and consensus compatibility is linear (where linearity reduces to dictatorship
in the binary case).
(b) For any other agenda X ( 6= f?;
g), there exists a non-linear binary or
probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence and consen-
sus compatibility.
Theorem 5+ (a) For any non-simple agenda X with jXnf
;?gj > 4, every
18To be precise, for (trivial) agendas with Xnf
;?g = ?, the weights wi may di¤er from 1
and 0. But it still follows that every linear binary opinion pooling function (in fact, every binary
opinion pooling function) is dictatorial here, for the trivial reason that there is only one binary
opinion function and thus only one (dictatorial) binary opinion pooling function.
19In the binary case, two of our unanimity-preservation requirements (implicit consensus
preservation and consensus compatibility) are equivalent, because every binary opinion func-
tion is uniquely extendible to (X). Also, conditional consensus compatibility can be stated
more easily in the binary case, namely in terms of a single conditional judgment rather than a
nite set of conditional judgments.
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binary or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence
and conditional consensus compatibility is linear (where linearity reduces to
dictatorship in the binary case).
(b) For any simple agenda X (nite and distinct from f?;
g), there exists
a non-linear binary or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying
independence and conditional consensus compatibility.
Theorem 6+ (a) For any path-connected and partitional agenda X, every bi-
nary or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence and
consensus preservation is linear (where linearity reduces to dictatorship in
the binary case).
(b) For any non-path-connected (nite) agenda X, there exists a non-linear bi-
nary or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence and
consensus preservation.20
By Lemma 9, Theorems 4+, 5+, and 6+ are relevant to preference aggrega-
tion insofar as the preference agenda XK satises each of non-nestedness, non-
simplicity, and path-connectedness if and only if jKj > 2, where K is the set of
alternatives. Recall, however, that the preference agenda is never partitional, so
that part (a) of Theorem 6+ never applies. By contrast, the binary result on which
part (a) is based applies to the preference agenda, as it uses the weaker condition
of even-number-negatability (or non-a¢ neness) instead of partitionality (and that
weaker condition is satised by XK if jKj > 2). As noted above, it remains an
open question how far partitionality can be weakened in the probabilistic case.21
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A Proofs
We now prove all our results. In light of the mathematical connection between
the present results and those in our companion paper on premise-basedopinion
pooling for -algebra agendas (Dietrich and List 2014), one might imagine two
possible proof strategies: either one could prove our present results directly and
those in the companion paper as corollaries, or vice versa. In fact, we will mix
those two strategies. We will prove parts (a) of all present theorems directly (and
use them in the companion paper to derive the corresponding results), while we
will prove parts (b) directly in some cases and as corollaries of corresponding
results from the companion paper in others.
This Appendix is organised as follows. In Sections A.1 to A.5, we prove parts
(a) of Theorems 2 to 6, along with related results. Theorem 1(a) requires no
independent proof, as it follows from Theorem 2(a). In Section A.6, we clarify
the connection between the two papers, and then prove parts (b) of all present
theorems. Finally, in Section A.7, we prove Propositions 1 and 2.
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A.1 Proof of Theorem 2(a)
As explained in the main text, Theorem 2(a) follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. We
now prove these lemmas. To do so, we will also prove some preliminary results.
Lemma 10 Consider any agenda X.
(a)  denes an equivalence relation on Xnf?;
g:
(b) A  B , Ac  Bc for all events A;B 2 Xnf?;
g.
(c) A  B ) A  B for all events A;B 2 Xnf?;
g.
(d) If X 6= f?;
g, the relation  has
 either a single equivalence class, namely Xnf?;
g,
 or exactly two equivalence classes, each one containing exactly one
member of each pair A;Ac 2 Xnf?;
g.
Proof. (a) Reexivity, symmetry, and transitivity on Xnf?;
g are all obvious
(we have excluded ? and 
 to ensure reexivity).
(b) It su¢ ces to prove one direction of implication (as (Ac)c = A for allA 2 X).
Let A;B 2 Xnf?;
g with A  B. Then there is a path A1; :::; Ak 2 X from A
to B such that any neighbours Aj; Aj+1 are non-exclusive and non-exhaustive. So
Ac1; :::; A
c
k is a path fromA
c toBc, where any neighbours Acj; A
c
j+1 are non-exclusive
(as Acj \ Acj+1 = (Aj [ Aj+1)c 6= 
c = ?) and non-exhaustive (as Acj [ Acj+1 =
(Aj \ Aj+1)c 6= ?c = 
). So, Ac  Bc.
(c) Let A;B 2 Xnf?;
g. If A  B, then A  B due to a direct connection,
because A;B are neither exclusive (as A \ B = A 6= ?) nor exhaustive (as
A [B = B 6= 
).
(d) Let X 6= f?;
g. Suppose the number of equivalence classes with respect
to  is not one. As Xnf?;
g 6= ?, it is not zero. So it is at least two. We show
two claims:
Claim 1. There are exactly two equivalence classes with respect to .
Claim 2. Each class contains exactly one member of any pairA;Ac 2 Xnf?;
g.
Proof of Claim 1. For a contradiction, let A;B;C 2 Xnf?;
g be pairwise
not (-)equivalent. By A 6 B, either A\B = ? or A[B = 
. We may assume
the former case, because in the latter case we may consider Ac; Bc; Cc instead
of A;B;C. (Note that Ac; Bc; Cc are again pairwise non-equivalent by (b) and
Ac \Bc = (A [B)c = 
c = ?.) Now, since A \B = ?, we have B  Ac, whence
Ac  B by (c). By A 6 C, there are two cases:
 either A \ C = ?, which implies C  Ac, whence C  Ac by (c), so that
C  B (as Ac  B and  is transitive by (a)), a contradiction;
 or A [ C = 
, which implies Ac  C, whence Ac  C by (c), so that again
we derive the contradiction C  B, which completes the proof of Claim 1.
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Proof of Claim 2. For a contradiction, let Z be an (-)equivalence class con-
taining the pair A;Ac. By assumption, Z is not the only equivalence class, so
there is a B 2 Xnf?;
g with B 6 A (hence B 6 Ac). Then either A \ B = ?
or A [ B = 
. In the rst case, B  Ac, so that B  Ac by (c), a contradiction.
In the second case, Ac  B, so that Ac  B by (c), a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider an agenda X 6= f?;
g. By Lemma 10(a),  is
indeed an equivalence relation on Xnf?;
g. By Lemma 10(d), it remains to
prove that X is nested if and only if there are exactly two equivalence classes.
Note that X is nested if and only if Xnf?;
g is nested. So we may assume
without loss of generality that ?;
 =2 X.
First, suppose there are two equivalence classes. Let X+ be one of them.
By Lemma 10(d), X = fA;Ac : A 2 X+g. To complete the proof that X is
nested, we show that X+ is linearly ordered by set-inclusion . Clearly,  is
reexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. We must show that it is connected. So,
let A;B 2 X+; we prove that A  B or B  A. Since A 6 Bc (by Lemma 10(d)),
either A \Bc = ? or A [Bc = 
. So, either A  B or B  A.
Conversely, let X be nested. So X = fA;Ac : A 2 X+g for some set X+  
that is linearly ordered by set inclusion. Let A 2 X+. We show that A 6 Ac,
implying that X has at least  so by Lemma 10(d) exactly  two equivalence
classes. For a contradiction, suppose A  Ac. Then there is a path A1; :::; Ak 2 X
from A = A1 to Ac = Ak such that, for all neighbours Aj; Aj+1, Aj \ Aj+1 6= ?
and Aj[Aj+1 6= 
. Since each event C 2 X either is in X+ or has its complement
in X+, and since A1 = A 2 X+ and Ack = A 2 X+, there are neighbours Aj; Aj+1
such that Aj; Acj+1 2 X+. So, as X+ is linearly ordered by , either Aj  Acj+1
or Acj+1  Aj, i.e., either Aj \ Aj+1 = ? or Aj [ Aj+1 = 
, a contradiction. 
We now give a useful re-formulation of the requirement of conditional consensus
compatibility for opinion pooling on a general agendaX. Note rst that an opinion
function is consistent with certainty of A (2 X) given B (2 X) if and only if it
is consistent with certainty of the event B implies A(i.e., with zero probability
of the event BnA or B but not A). This observation yields the following re-
formulation of conditional consensus compatibility (in which the roles of A and B
have been interchanged):
Implication preservation. For all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , and all nite sets S of pairs
(A;B) of events in X, if every opinion function Pi is consistent with certainty
that A implies B for all (A;B) in S (i.e., some extension P i 2 P(X) of Pi satises
P i(AnB) = 0 for all pairs (A;B) 2 S), then so is the collective opinion function
PP1;:::;Pn.
Proposition 3 For any agenda X, a pooling function F : PnX ! PX is conditional
consensus compatible if and only if it is implication preserving.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Let F be an independent and conditional-consensus-compatible
pooling function for agenda X. For all A 2 X, let DA be the pooling criterion
given by independence. We show that DA = DB for all A;B 2 X with A\B 6= ?
and A [ B 6= 
. This will imply that DA = DB whenever A  B (by induction
on the length of a path from A to B), which completes the proof.
So, let A;B 2 X with A \B 6= ? and A [B 6= 
. Notice that A \B, A [B,
and AnB need not belong to X. Let x 2 [0; 1]n; we show that DA(x) = DB(x).
As A \ B 6= ? and Ac \ Bc = (A [ B)c 6= ?, there are P 1; :::; P n 2 P(X) such
that
P i(A \B) = xi and P i(Ac \Bc) = 1  xi for all i = 1; :::; n.
Now consider the opinion functions P1; :::; Pn 2 PX given by Pi := P ijX . Since
P i(AnB) = 0 and P i(BnA) = 0 for all i, the collective opinion function PP1;:::;Pn
has an extension P P1;:::;Pn 2 P(X) such that P P1;:::;Pn(AnB) = P P1;:::;Pn(BnA) = 0,
by implication preservation (which is equivalent to conditional consensus compat-
ibility by Proposition 3). So P P1;:::;Pn(A) = P P1;:::;Pn(A \ B) = P P1;:::;Pn(B), and
hence, PP1;:::;Pn(A) = PP1;:::;Pn(B). So, using the fact that PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(x)
(as Pi(A) = xi for all i) and PP1;:::;Pn(B) = DB(x) (as Pi(B) = xi for all i), we
have DA(x) = DB(x). 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3(a)
As explained in the main text, Theorem 3(a) follows from Lemma 3, which we
now prove.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let F : PnX ! PX be independent and consensus-preserving.
Let A;B 2 X such that A ` B, say in virtue of (countable) set Y  X. Write DA
and DB for the pooling criterion for A and B, respectively. Let x = (x1; :::; xn) 2
[0; 1]n. We show thatDA(x)  DB(x). As \C2fAg[YC is non-empty but has empty
intersection with Bc (by the conditional entailment), it equals its intersection with
B, so \C2fA;Bg[YC 6= ?. Similarly, as \C2fBcg[YC is non-empty but has empty
intersection with A, it equals its intersection with Ac, so \C2fAc;Bcg[YC 6= ?.
Hence there exist ! 2 \C2fA;Bg[YC and !0 2 \C2fAc;Bcg[YC. For each individual
i, we dene a probability function P i : (X)! [0; 1] by P i := xi! + (1  xi)!0
(where !; !0 : (X) ! [0; 1] are the Dirac-measures at ! and !0, respectively),
and we then let Pi := P i jX . As each Pi satises Pi(A) = Pi(B) = xi,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) = DA(x),
PP1;:::;Pn(B) = DB(P1(B); :::; Pn(B)) = DB(x).
Further, for each Pi and each C 2 Y , we have Pi(C) = 1, so that PP1;:::;Pn(C) = 1
(by consensus preservation). Hence PP1;:::;Pn(\C2YC) = 1, since countable inter-
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sections preserve probability one. So,
PP1;:::;Pn(\C2fAg[YC) = PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(x),
PP1;:::;Pn(\C2fBg[YC) = PP1;:::;Pn(B) = DB(x).
To prove that DA(x)  DB(x), it su¢ ces to show that PP1;:::;Pn(\C2fAg[YC) 
PP1;:::;Pn(\C2fBg[YC). This is true because
\C2fAg[YC = \C2fA;Bg[Y  \C2fBg[YC,
where the identity holds by an earlier argument. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4(a)
As explained in the main text, Theorem 4(a) follows from Theorem 1(a) via
Lemmas 4 and 5.22 It remains to prove both lemmas. We draw on a known
agenda characterization result and a technical lemma.
Proposition 4 (Dietrich 2013) For any agenda X, the following are equivalent:
(a) X is non-nested with jXnf
;?gj > 4;
(b) X has a (consistent or inconsistent) subset Y with jY j  3 such that
(Y nfAg) [ fAcg is consistent for each A 2 Y ;
(c) X has a (consistent or inconsistent) subset Y with jY j = 3 such that
(Y nfAg) [ fAcg is consistent for each A 2 Y .
Lemma 11 If D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neutral pooling
function for an agenda X (6= f
;?g), then
(a) D(x) +D(1  x) = 1 for all x 2 [0; 1]n,
(b) D(0) = 0 and D(1) = 1, provided the pooling function is consensus preserv-
ing.
Proof. (a) As X 6= f
;?g, we may pick some A 2 Xnf
;?g. For each x 2
[0; 1]n, there exist (by A 6= ?;
) opinion functions P1; :::; Pn 2 PX such that
(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) = x, which implies that (P1(Ac); :::; Pn(Ac)) = 1  x and
D(x) +D(1  x) = PP1;:::;Pn(A) + PP1;:::;Pn(Ac) = 1.
(b) Given consensus-preservation D(1) = 1. By part (a), D(0) = 1   D(1).
So D(0) = 0. 
22This uses Lemma 11(b) below, where consensus preservation holds by consensus compati-
bility.
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Proof of Lemma 4. Let D be the local pooling criterion of such a pooling function
for such an agenda X. Consider any x; y; z 2 [0; 1]n with sum 1. By Proposition
4, there exist A;B;C 2 X such that each of the sets
A := Ac \B \ C, B := A \Bc \ C, C := A \B \ Cc
is non-empty. For all individuals i, since xi + yi + zi = 1 and since A; B; C
are pairwise disjoint non-empty members of (X), there exists a P i 2 P(X) such
that P i (A
) = xi, P i (B
) = yi and P i (C
) = zi. By construction,
P i (A
 [B [ C) = xi + yi + zi = 1 for all i: (3)
Let Pi := P i jX for each individual i. For the prole (P1; :::; Pn) 2 PnX thus dened,
we consider the collective opinion function PP1;:::;Pn. We complete the proof by
proving two claims.
Claim 1. P (A) + P (B) + P (C) = P (A [ B [ C) = 1 for some
P  2 P(X) extending PP1;:::;Pn.
The rst identity holds for all extensions P  2 P(X) of P , by pairwise dis-
jointness of A; B; C. For the second identity, note that each Pi has an extension
P i 2 P(X) for which P i (A [ B [ C) = 1, so that by consensus compatibility
PP1;:::;Pn also has such an extension.
Claim 2. D(x) +D(y) +D(z) = 1.
Consider an extension P  2 P(X) of PP1;:::;Pn of the kind in Claim 1. As
P (A [B [ C) = 1, and as the intersection of Ac with A [B [ C is A,
P (Ac) = P (A): (4)
Since Ac 2 X, we further have P (Ac) = PP1;:::;Pn(Ac) = D(P1(Ac); :::; Pn(Ac)),
where Pi(Ac) = P i (A
c) = xi for each individual i. So, P (Ac) = D(x). This and
(4) imply that P (A) = D(x). Analogously, P (B) = D(y) and P (C) = D(z).
So, Claim 2 follows from Claim 1. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider any D : [0; 1n]! [0; 1] such that D(0) = 0 and
D(x) +D(y) +D(z) = 1 for all x; y; z 2 [0; 1]n with x+ y + z = 1: (5)
We have D(1) = 1 (since D(1) +D(0) +D(0) = 1 where D(0) = 0) and
D(x) +D(1  x) = 1 for all x 2 [0; 1] (6)
(since D(x) +D(1  x) +D(0) = 1 where D(0) = 0). Using (5) and then (6), for
all x; y 2 [0; 1]n with x+ y 2 [0; 1]n,
1 = D(x) +D(y) +D(1  x  y) = D(x) +D(y) + 1 D(x+ y).
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So,
D(x+ y) = D(x) +D(y) for all x; y 2 [0; 1]n with x+ y 2 [0; 1]n: (7)
Consider any individual i. We deneDi : [0; 1]! [0; 1] byDi(t) = D(0; :::; 0; t; 0; :::; 0),
where t occurs at position i in (0; :::; 0; t; 0; :::; 0). By (7), Di(s+t) = Di(s)+Di(t)
for all s; t  0 with s + t  1. As one can easily check, Di can be extended to a
function Di : [0;1)! [0;1) such that Di(s+ t) = Di(s) + Di(t) for all s; t  0,
i.e., such that Di satises the non-negative version of Cauchys functional equa-
tion. So, there is some wi  0 such that Di(t) = wit for all t  0 (by Theorem 1
in Aczél 1966). Now, for all x 2 [0; 1]n, D(x) =
Xn
i=1
Di(xi) (by repeated appli-
cation of (7)), and so (as Di(xi) = Di(xi) = wixi) D(x) =
Xn
i=1
wixi. Applying
the latter with x = 1 yields D(1) =
Xn
i=1
wi, hence
Xn
i=1
wi = 1. 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 5(a)
As explained in the main text, Theorem 5(a) follows from Theorem 2(a) via
Lemmas 6 and 5.23 It remains to prove Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 6. LetD be the local pooling criterion of a neutral and conditional-
consensus-compatible pooling function for a non-simple agenda X. Consider any
x; y; z 2 [0; 1]n with sum 1. As X is non-simple, there is a (countable) minimal
inconsistent set Y  X with jY j  3. Pick pairwise distinct A;B;C 2 Y . Let
A :=
\
E2Y nfAg
E, B :=
\
E2Y nfBg
E, C :=
\
E2Y nfCg
E.
As (X) is closed under countable intersections, A; B; C 2 (X). For each i,
as xi + yi + zi = 1 and as A; B; C are (by Y s minimal inconsistency) pairwise
disjoint non-empty members of (X), there exists a P i 2 P(X) such that
P i (A
) = xi; P i (B
) = yi; P i (C
) = zi.
By construction,
P i (A
 [B [ C) = xi + yi + zi = 1 for all i. (8)
Now let Pi := P i jX for each individual i, and let P := PP1;:::;Pn. We derive four
properties of P (Claims 1-4), which then allow us to show that D(x) + D(y) +
D(z) = 1 (Claim 5).
Claim 1. P (\E2Y nfA;B;CgE) = 1 for all extensions P  2 P(X) of P .
23This uses Lemma 11(b), where consensus preservation holds by conditional consensus com-
patibility.
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For all E 2 Y nfA;B;Cg, we have E  A [ B [ C, so that by (8)
P1(E) = ::: = Pn(E) = 1, and hence P (E) = 1 (by consensus preservation, which
follows from conditional consensus compatibility by Proposition 1(a)). So, for any
extension P  2 P(X) of P , we have P (E) = 1 for all E 2 Y nfA;B;Cg. Thus
P (\E2Y nfA;B;CgE) = 1, as countable intersections preserve probability one.
Claim 2. P (Ac [Bc [ Cc) = 1 for all extensions P  2 P(X) of P .
Let P  2 P(X) be an extension of P . Since A \ B \ C is disjoint from
\E2Y nfA;B;CgE, which has P -probability one by Claim 1, P (A \ B \ C) = 0.
This implies Claim 2, since
Ac [Bc [ Cc = (A \B \ C)c.
Claim 3. P ((Ac\B\C)[(A\Bc\C)[(A\B\Cc)) = 1 for some extension
P  2 P(X) of P .
As Ac \Bc is disjoint with each of A; B; C, it is disjoint with A [B [C,
which has P i -probability of one for all individuals i by (8). So, P

i (A
c \Bc) = 0,
i.e., P i (A
cnB) = 0, for all i. Analogously, P i (AcnC) = 0 and P i (BcnC) = 0
for all i. Since, as just shown, each Pi has an extension P i which assigns zero
probability to AcnB, AcnC and BcnC, by conditional consensus compatibility
(and Proposition 3) the collective opinion function P also has an extension P  2
P(X) assigning zero probability to these three events, and hence, to their union
(AcnB)[(AcnC)[(BcnC) = (Ac\Bc)[(Ac\Cc)[(Bc\Cc). In other words, with
P -probability of zero at least two of Ac; Bc; Cc hold. Further, with P -probability
of one at least one of Ac; Bc; Cc holds (by Claim 2). So, with P -probability of
one exactly one of Ac; Bc; Cc holds. This is precisely what had to be shown.
Claim 4. P (A)+P (B)+P (C) = P (A[B[C) = 1 for some extension
P  2 P(X) of P .
Consider an extension P  2 P(X) of P of the kind in Claim 3. The rst
identity follows from the pairwise disjointness of A; B; C. Regarding the second
identity, note that A [ B [ C is the intersection of the events \E2Y nfA;B;CgE
and (Ac \B \C)[ (A\Bc \C)[ (A\B \Cc), each of which has P -probability
of one by Claims 1 and 3. So P (A [B [ C) = 1.
Claim 5. D(x) +D(y) +D(z) = 1.
Consider an extension P  2 P(X) of P of the kind in Claim 4. As P (A [
B [ C) = 1 by Claim 4, and as the intersection of Ac with A [B [ C is A,
P (Ac) = P (A): (9)
Since Ac 2 X, we also have
P (Ac) = PP1;:::;Pn(A
c) = D(P1(A
c); :::; Pn(A
c)),
where Pi(Ac) = P i (A
c) = xi for all individuals i. So P (Ac) = D(x). This and
(9) imply that P (A) = D(x). Similarly, P (B) = D(y) and P (C) = D(z).
So Claim 5 follows from Claim 4. 
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 6(a)
As explained in the main text, Theorem 6(a) follows from Theorem 3(a) via
Lemmas 7 and 5 (while applying Lemma 11(b)). It remains to prove Lemma
7.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let D be the local pooling criterion for such a pooling function
for a partitional agenda X. Consider any x; y; z 2 [0; 1]n with sum 1. Since X
is partitional, some countable Y  X partitions 
 into at least three non-empty
events. Choose distinct A;B;C 2 Y . For each individual i, since xi + yi + zi = 1
and since A, B and C are pairwise disjoint and non-empty, there is some Pi 2 PX
such that
Pi(A) = xi; Pi(B) = yi; Pi(C) = zi.
Let P be the collective opinion function for this prole. Since Y is a count-
able partition of 
 and P can be extended to a (-additive) probability function,P
E2Y P (E) = 1. Now, for each E 2 Y nfA;B;Cg, we have P (E) = 0 by consen-
sus preservation (as Pi(E) = 0 for all i). So P (A) + P (B) + P (C) = 1. Hence
D(x) +D(y) +D(z) = 1 because
P (A) = D(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) = D(x);
P (A) = D(P1(B); :::; Pn(B)) = D(y);
P (A) = D(P1(C); :::; Pn(C)) = D(z). 
A.6 Proof of parts (b) of all theorems
Parts (b) of three of the six theorems will be proved by reduction to results in
the companion paper. To prepare this reduction, we rst relate opinion pooling
on a general agenda X to premise-based opinion pooling on a -algebra agenda,
as analysed in the companion paper. Consider any agenda X and any -algebra
agenda  of which X is a subagenda. (A subagenda of an agenda is a subset which
is itself an agenda, i.e., a non-empty subset closed under complementation.) For
instance,  could be (X). We can think of the pooling function F for X as being
induced by a pooling function F  for the larger agenda . Formally, a pooling
function F  : Pn ! P for agenda  induces the pooling function F : PnX ! PX
for (sub)agenda X if F  and F generate the same collective opinions within X,
i.e.,
F (P1jX ; :::; PnjX) = F (P1; :::; Pn)jX for all P1; :::; Pn 2 P:
(Strictly speaking, we further require that PX = fP jX : P 2 Pg, but this
requirement holds automatically in standard cases, e.g., if X is nite or (X) =
.24) We call F  the inducing pooling function, and F the induced one. Our
24In these cases, each opinion function in PX is extendable not just to a probability function
on (X), but also to one on . In general, extensions beyond (X) may not always be possible,
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axiomatic requirements on the induced pooling function F i.e., independence and
the various consensus requirements can be related to the following requirements
on the inducing pooling function F  for the agenda  (introduced and discussed
in the companion paper):
Independence on X. For each A in subagenda X, there exists a function DA :
[0; 1]n ! [0; 1] (the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P1; :::; Pn 2 P,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)).
Consensus preservation. For all A 2  and all P1; :::; Pn 2 P, if Pi(A) = 1
for all individuals i then PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1.
Consensus preservation on X. For all A in subagenda X and all P1; :::; Pn 2
P, if Pi(A) = 1 for all individuals i then PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1.
Conditional consensus preservation on X. For all A;B in subagenda X and
all P1; :::; Pn 2 P, if, for each individual i, Pi(AjB) = 1 (provided Pi(B) 6= 0),
then PP1;:::;Pn(AjB) = 1 (provided PP1;:::;Pn(B) 6= 0).25
The following lemma establishes some key relationships between the properties
of the induced and the inducing pooling functions:
Lemma 12 Suppose a pooling function F  for a -algebra agenda  induces a
pooling function F for a subagenda X (where X is nite or (X) = ). Then:
 F is independent (respectively, neutral, linear) if and only if F  is indepen-
dent (respectively, neutral, linear) on X;
 F is consensus-preserving if and only if F  is consensus-preserving on X;
 F is consensus-compatible if F  is consensus-preserving;
 F is conditional-consensus-compatible if F  is conditional-consensus-
preserving on X.
This lemma follows from a more general result on the correspondence between
opinion pooling on general agendas and on -algebra agendas.26
as is well-known from measure theory. For instance, if 
 = R, X consists of all intervals or
complements thereof, and  = 2R, then (X) contains the Borel-measurable subsets of R, and
it is well-known that measures on (X) may not be extendable to  = 2R (a fact related to the
Banach-Tarski paradox).
25If one compares this requirement with that of conditional consensus compatibility for a
general agenda X, one might wonder why the new requirement involves only a single conditional
certainty (i.e., that of A given B), whereas the earlier requirement involves an entire set of
conditional certainties (which must be respected simultaneously). The key point is that if each
Pi is a probability function on , then the simplied requirement as stated here implies the
more complicated requirement from the main text.
26More precisely, Lemma 12 is a corollary of a slightly generalized statement of Lemma 13, in
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Lemma 13 Consider an agenda X and the corresponding -algebra agenda  =
(X). Any pooling function for X is
(a) induced by some pooling function for agenda ;
(b) independent (respectively, neutral, linear) if and only if every inducing pool-
ing function for agenda  is independent (respectively, neutral, linear) on
X, where everycan further be replaced by some;
(c) consensus-preserving if and only if every inducing pooling function for agenda
 is consensus-preserving on X, where every can further be replaced by
some;
(d) consensus-compatible if and only if some inducing pooling function for agenda
 is consensus-preserving;
(e) conditional-consensus-compatible if and only if some inducing pooling func-
tion for agenda  is conditional-consensus-preserving on X
(where in (d) and (e) the only ifclaim assumes that X is nite).
Proof of Lemma 13. Consider an agenda X, the generated -algebra  = (X),
and a pooling function F for X.
(a) For each P 2 PX , x an extension in P denoted P . Consider the pooling
function F  for  dened by F (P 1 ; :::; P

n) = F (P

1 jX ; :::; P n jX) for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2
P.Clearly, F  induces F (regardless of how the extensions P of P 2 PX were
chosen).
(b) We give a proof for the independencecase; the proofs for the neutrality
and linearitycases are analogous. Note (using part (a)) that replacing everyby
somestrengthens the ifclaim and weakens the only ifclaim. It thus su¢ ces
to prove the ifclaim with some, and the only ifclaim with every. Clearly,
if some inducing F  is independent on X, then F inherits independence. Now let
F be independent with pooling criteria DA; A 2 X. Consider any F  : Pn ! Pn
inducing F . Then F  is independent on X with the same pooling criteria as for
F because for all A 2 X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P we have
F (P 1 ; :::; P

n)(A) = F (P

1 jX ; :::; P n jX)(A) as F  induces F
= DA(P

1 jX(A); :::; P n jX(A)) by Fs independence
= DA(P

1 (A); :::; P

n(A)).
(c) As in part (b), it su¢ ces to prove the ifclaim with some, and the only
if claim with every. Clearly, if some inducing F  is consensus-preserving on
X, F inherits consensus preservation. Now let F be consensus-preserving and
induced by F . Then F  is consensus-preserving on X because, for all A 2 X and
which  is either (X) or, if X is nite, any -algebra which includes X. Our proof of Lemma
13 can be extended to this generalized statement (drawing on Lemma 15 and using an argument
related to the Claimin the proof of Theorem 1(b) of the companion paper).
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P 1 ; :::; P

n 2 P such that P 1 (A) =    = P n(A) = 1, we have
F (P 1 ; :::; P

n)(A) = F (P

1 jX ; :::; P n jX)(A) as F  induces F
= 1 as F is consensus preserving.
(d) First, let F be consensus-compatible and X nite. We dene F  as fol-
lows. For any P 1 ; :::; P

n 2 P, consider the event A in  which is smallest
subject to having probability one under each P i . This event exists and is con-
structible as A = \A2(X):P 1 (A)==P n(A)=1A, drawing on niteness of  = (X)
and the fact that intersections of nitely many events of probability one have
probability one. Clearly, A is the union of the supports of the functions P i .
We dene F (P 1 ; :::; P

n) as any extension in P of F (P 1 jX ; ::::; P n jX) assign-
ing probability one to A. Such an extension exists because F is consensus-
compatible and each P i jX is extendable to a probability function (namely P i )
assigning probability one to A. Clearly, F  induces F . It also is consensus-
preserving: for all P 1 ; :::; P

n 2 P and A 2 , if P 1 (A) =    = P n(A) = 1,
then A includes the above-constructed event A, whence F (P 1 ; :::; P

n)(A) = 1 as
F (P 1 ; :::; P

n)(A
) = 1.
Conversely, let some inducing pooling function F  be consensus-preserving.
To see why F is consensus-compatible, consider P1; :::; Pn 2 PX and A 2  such
that each Pi has an extension P i 2 P for which P i(A) = 1. We show that
some extension P 2 P of F (P1; :::; Pn) satises P (A) = 1. Simply let P be
F (P 1; :::; P n) and note that P is indeed an extension of F (P1; :::; Pn) (as F 
induces F ) and P (A) = 1 (as F  is consensus-preserving).
(e) First, let F be conditional-consensus-compatible, and let X be nite. We
dene F  as follows. For a prole (P 1 ; :::; P

n) 2 Pn, consider the (nite) set S of
pairs (A;B) in X such that P i (AjB) = 1 for each i with P i (B) 6= 0 (equivalently,
such that P i (BnA) = 0 for each i). Since F is conditional-consensus-compatible
(and since in the last sentence we can replace each P i with P

i jX), there is an
extension P  2 P of F (P 1 jX ; :::; P n jX) such that P (AjB) = 1 for all (A;B) 2 S
for which P (B) 6= 0. Let F (P 1 ; :::; P n) := P . Clearly, F  induces F and is
conditional-consensus-preserving on X.
Conversely, let some inducing F  be conditional-consensus-preserving on X.
To check that F is conditional-consensus-compatible, consider P1; :::; Pn 2 PX
and a nite set S of pairs (A;B) in X such that each Pi can be extended to
P i 2 P with P i(AjB) = 1 (provided P i(B) 6= 0). We require an extension
P  2 P of F (P1; :::; Pn) such that P (AjB) = 1 for all (A;B) 2 S for which
P (B) 6= 0. Now P  := F (P 1; :::; P n) is such an extension, since F  induces F
and is conditional-consensus-preserving on X. 
Which pooling functions for  induce ones forX? Here is a su¢ cient condition:
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Lemma 14 If a pooling function for a -algebra agenda  is independent on a
subagenda X (where X is nite or (X) = ), then it induces a pooling function
for agenda X.
The proof draws on a measure-theoretic fact in which the word niteis es-
sential:
Lemma 15 Every probability function on a nite sub--algebra of -algebra 
can be extended to a probability function on .
Proof. Let 0   be a nite sub--algebra of -algebra , and consider any
P 0 2 P0. Let A be the set of atoms of 0, i.e., (-)minimal events in 0nf?g.
As 0 is nite, A must partition 
. So,
X
A2A
P 0(A) = 1. For each A 2 A,
let QA be a probability function on  such that QA(A) = 1. (Such functions
exist, since each QA could for instance be the Dirac measure at some !A 2 A.)
Then P :=
X
A2A
P 0(A)QAdenes a probability function on , because (given
the identity
X
A2A:P 0(A) 6=0
P 0(A) = 1) it is a convex combination of probability
functions on . Further, P extends P 0, because it agrees with P 0 on A, hence on
0. 
Proof of Lemma 14. Suppose the pooling function F for -algebra agenda  is
independent on subagenda X, and that X is nite or (X) = . Let 0 := (X).
If X is nite, so is 0. Each P 2 PX can by denition be extended to a function
in P0, which (by Lemma 15 in case 0 is a nite -algebra distinct from ) can
be extended to a function in P. For any Q 2 PX , pick an extension Q 2 P.
Dene a pooling function F 0 for X by
F 0(Q1; :::; Qn) := F (Q1; :::; Qn)jX for all Q1; :::; Qn 2 PX .
Now F induces F 0 for two reasons. First, for all P1; :::; Pn 2 P,
F 0(P1jX ; :::; PnjX) = F (P1jX ; :::; PnjX)jX = F (P1; :::; Pn)jX ,
where the second =holds as F is independent on X. Second, PX = fP jX : P 2
Pg, where is trivial and holds because each P 2 PX equals P jX . 
Proof of parts (b) of Theorems 1-6. First, Theorems 2(b) and 6(b) follow directly
from Theorems 1(b) and 3(b), respectively, since consensus compatibility implies
conditional consensus compatibility (by Proposition 1) and as non-neutrality im-
plies non-linearity.
Second, we derive Theorems 1(b), 3(b) and 5(b) from the corresponding results
in the companion paper, namely Theorems 1(b), 3(b), and 5(b), respectively. The
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derivations are similar for the three results; we thus spell out the derivation only
for Theorem 1(b). Consider a nested agenda X 6= f
;?g. By the companion
papers Theorem 1(b) (see also the footnote to it), some pooling function F  for
agenda  := (X) is independent on X, (globally) consensus preserving and non-
neutral on X. By Lemma 14, F  induces a pooling function for (sub)agenda X,
which by Lemma 12 is independent, consensus-compatible, and non-neutral.
Finally, we prove Theorem 4(b) directly rather than by reduction. Consider
an agenda X 6= f?;
g which is nested or satises jXnf?;
gj  4. If X is nested,
the claim follows from Theorem 1(b), since non-neutrality implies non-linearity.
Now let X be non-nested and jXnf?;
gj  4. We may assume without loss of
generality that ?;
 62 X (as any independent, consensus-compatible, and non-
neutral pooling function for agenda X 0 = Xnf?;
g induces one for agenda X).
Since jXj  4, and since jXj > 2 (as X is non-nested), we have jXj = 4, say
X = fA;Ac; B;Bcg. By non-nestedness, A and B are logically independent, i.e.,
the events A\B, A\Bc, Ac\B, and Ac\Bc are all non-empty. On PnX , consider
the function F : (P1; ::; Pn) 7! T P1, where T (p) is 1 if p = 1, 0 if p = 0, and 12 if
p 2 (0; 1). We complete the proof by establishing that (i) F maps into PX , i.e., is
a proper pooling function, (ii) F is consensus-compatible, (iii) F is independent,
and (iv) F is non-linear. Claims (iii) and (iv) hold trivially.
Proof of (i): Let P1; :::; Pn 2 PX and P := F (P1; :::; Pn) = T  P1. We need
to extend P to a probability function on (X). For each atom C of (X) (i.e.,
each C 2 fA \ B;A \ Bc; Ac \ B;Ac \ Bcg), let PC be the unique probability
function on (X) assigning probability one to C. We distinguish between three
(exhaustive) cases.
Case 1 : P1(E) = 1 for two events E in X. Without loss of generality, let
P1(A) = P1(B) = 1, and hence, P1(Ac) = P1(Bc) = 0. It follows that P (A) =
P (B) = 1 and P (Ac) = P (Bc) = 0. So P extends (in fact, uniquely) to a
probability function on (X), namely to PA\B.
Case 2 : P1(E) = 1 for exactly one event E in X. Without loss of generality,
assume P1(A) = 1 (hence, P1(Ac) = 0) and P1(B); P1(Bc) 2 (0; 1). Hence,
P (A) = 1, P (Ac) = 0 and P (B) = P (Bc) = 1
2
. So P extends (again uniquely) to
a probability function on (X), namely to 1
2
PA\B + 12PA\Bc.
Case 3 : P1(E) = 1 for no event E in X. Then P1(A); P1(Ac); P1(B); P1(Bc) 2
(0; 1), and so P (A) = P (Ac) = P (B) = P (Bc) = 1
2
. Hence, P extends (non-
uniquely) to a probability function on (X), e.g., to 1
2
PA\B+ 12PAc\Bc or
1
4
PA\B+
1
4
PAc\B + 14PA\Bc +
1
4
PAc\Bc.
Proof of (ii): Let P1; :::; Pn 2 PX and consider any C 2 (X) such that
each Pi extends to some P i 2 P(X) such that P i (C) = 1. (It only matters
that P1 has such an extension, given the denition of F .) We have to show that
P := F (P1; :::; Pn) = T  P1 is extendable to a P  2 P(X) such that P (C) = 1.
We verify the claim in each of the three cases considered in the proof of (i). In
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Cases 1 and 2, the claim holds because the (unique) extension P  2 P(X) of
P has the same support as P 1 . (In fact, in Case 1 P
 = P 1 .) In Case 3, C
must intersect with each event in X (otherwise some event in X would have zero
probability under P1, in contradiction with Case 3) and include more than one of
the atoms A \ B, A \ Bc, Ac \ B, and Ac \ Bc (again by Case 3). As is easily
checked, C  (A\B)[(Ac\Bc) or C  (A\Bc)[(Ac\B). So, to ensure that the
extension P  or P satises P (C) = 1, it su¢ ces to specify P  as 1
2
PA\B+ 12PAc\Bc
in the rst case, and as 1
2
PA\Bc + 12PAc\B in the second case. 
A.7 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider an opinion pooling function for an agenda X.
We rst prove part (b), by showing that conditional consensus compatibility is
equivalent to the restriction of consensus compatibility to events A expressible as
([(C;D)2S(CnD))c for nite S  X  X. This fact follows from the equivalence
of conditional consensus compatibility and implication preservation (Proposition
3) and the observation that, for any such set S, an opinion function is consistent
with zero probability of all CnD with (C;D) 2 S if and only if it is consistent
with zero probability of [(C;D)2S(CnD), i.e., probability one of ([(C;D)2S(CnD))c.
We now prove part (a) The claims made about implicit consensus preserva-
tion and consensus compatibility have already been proved (informally) in the
main text. It remains to show that conditional consensus compatibility implies
consensus preservation and is equivalent to it if X = (X). As just shown,
conditional consensus compatibility is equivalent to the restriction of consen-
sus compatibility to events A of the form ([(C;D)2S(CnD))c for some nite set
S  X  X. Note that, for any A 2 X, we may dene S as f(Ac; A)g, so
that ([(C;D)2S(CnD))c = (AcnA)c = A. So, conditional consensus compatibility
implies consensus preservation and is equivalent to it if X = (X). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume j
j  4. We can thus partition 
 into four non-
empty events and let X consist of any union of two of these four events. The
set X is indeed an agenda since A 2 X , Ac 2 X. Since nothing depends on
the sizes of the four events, we assume without loss of generality that they are
singleton, i.e., that 
 = f!1; !2; !3; !4g and X = fA  
 : jAj = 2g.
Step 1. We here show that X is path-connected and non-partitional. Non-
partitionality is trivial. To establish path-connectedness, we consider eventsA;B 2
X and must construct a path of conditional entailments from A to B. This is
done by distinguishing between three cases.
Case 1 : A = B. Then the path is trivial, since A ` A (take Y = ?).
Case 2 : A and B have exactly one world in common. Call it !, and let !0 be
the unique world in 
n(A [B). Then A ` B in virtue of Y = ff!; !0gg.
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Case 3 : A and B have no world in common. We may then write A = f!A; !0Ag
and B = f!B; !0Bg with !A; !0A; !B; !0B pairwise distinct. Now f!A; !0Ag `
f!A; !Bg (take Y = ff!A; !0Bgg) and f!A; !Bg ` f!B; !0Bg (take Y = ff!B; !0Agg).
Step 2. We now construct a pooling function (P1; :::; Pn) 7! PP1;:::;Pn that is
independent (in fact, neutral), consensus-preserving, and non-linear. As an ingre-
dient of the construction, consider rst a linear pooling function L : PnX ! PX
(for instance the dictatorial one given by (P1; :::; Pn) 7! P1). We shall transform
L into a non-linear pooling function that is still neutral and consensus-preserving.
First, x a transformation T : [0; 1]! [0; 1] such that:
(i) T (1  x) = 1  T (x) for all x 2 [0; 1] (hence T (1=2) = 1=2),
(ii) T (0) = 0 (hence by (i) T (1) = 1),
(iii) T is strictly concave on [0; 1=2] (hence by (i) strictly convex on [1=2; 1]).
(Such a T exists; e.g. T (x) = 4(x   1=2)3 + 1=2 for all x 2 [0; 1].) Now, for
any P1; :::; Pn 2 PX and A 2 X, let PP1;:::;Pn(A) := T (L(P1; :::; Pn)(A)). We must
prove that, for any P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , the function PP1;:::;Pn, as just dened, can
indeed be extended to a probability function on (X) = 2
. This completes the
proof, as it establishes that we have dened a proper pooling function and this
pooling function is neutral (since L is neutral), consensus-preserving (since L is
consensus-preserving and T (1) = 1), and non-linear (since L is linear and T a
non-linear transformation).
To show that PP1;:::;Pn can be extended to a probability function on (X) = 2

,
we consider any probability function Q on 2
 and show that T  QjX extends
to a probability function on 2
 (which completes our task, since QjX could be
L(P1; :::; Pn) for P1; :::; Pn 2 PX). It su¢ ces to prove that there exist real numbers
pk = p
Q
k , k = 1; 2; 3; 4, such that the function on 2

 assigning pk to each f!kg is
a probability function and extends T QjX , i.e., such that
(a) p1; p2; p3; p4  0 and p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1,
(b) for all A 2 X, T (Q(A)) =
X
k:!k2A
pk.
For all k 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, let qk := Q(f!kg); and for all k; l 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g with
k < l, let qkl := Q(f!k; !lg). In order for p1; :::; p4 to satisfy (b), they must satisfy
the system
pk + pl = T (qkl) for all k; l 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g with k < l.
Given p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1, three of these six equations are redundant. Indeed,
consider k; l 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, k < l, and dene k0; l0 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, k0 < l0, by fk0; l0g =
f1; 2; 3; 4gnfk; lg. As pk+pl = 1 pk0 pl0 and T (qkl) = T (1  qk0l0) = 1 T (qk0l0),
the equation pk + pl = T (qkl) is equivalent to pk0 + pl0 = T (qk
0l0). So (b) reduces
(given p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1) to the system
p1 + p2 = T (q12), p1 + p3 = T (q13), p2 + p3 = T (q23).
This is a system of three linear equations in three variables p1; p2; p3 2 R. To solve
it, let tkl := T (qkl) for all k; l 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, k < l. We rst bring the coe¢ cient
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matrix of our three-equation system into triangular form:0@ 1 1 t121 1 t13
1 1 t23
1A !
0@ 1 1 t12 1 1 t13   t12
2 t23 + t13   t12
1A
!
0@ 1 1 t121 -1 t12   t13
1 t23+t13 t12
2
1A .
The system therefore has the following solution:
p3 =
t23 + t13   t12
2
(10)
p2 = t12   t13 + t23 + t13   t12
2
=
t12 + t23   t13
2
(11)
p1 = t12   t12 + t23   t13
2
=
t12 + t13   t23
2
Recalling that p4 = 1  (p1 + p2 + p3), we also have
p4 = 1  t12 + t13 + t23
2
: (12)
By their construction, the numbers p1; :::; p4 given by (10)-(12) satisfy condition
(b) and equation p1 + :::+ p4 = 1. To complete the proof of conditions (a)-(b), it
remains to show that p1; :::; p4  0. We do this by proving two claims.
Claim 1. p4  0, i.e., t12+t13+t232  1.
We have to prove that T (q12) + T (q13) + T (q23)  2. Note that
q12 + q13 + q23 = q
1 + q2 + q1 + q3 + q2 + q3 = 2(q1 + q2 + q3)  2.
We distinguish three cases.
Case 1 : All of q12; q13; q23 are all at least 1=2. Then, by (i)-(iii), T (q12) +
T (q13) + T (q23)  q12 + q13 + q23  2, as desired.
Case 2 : At least two of q12; q13; q23 are below 1=2. Then, again using (i)-(iii),
T (q12) + T (q13) + T (q23) < 1=2 + 1=2 + 1 = 2, as desired.
Case 3 : Exactly one of q12; q13; q23 is below 1=2. Suppose q12 < 1=2  q13  q23
(otherwise just switch the roles of q12; q13; q23). For all   0 such that q23+  1,
the properties (i)-(iii) of T imply that
T (q13) + T (q23)  T (q13   ) + T (q23 + ): (13)
Since the graphical intuition for (13) is clear, let us only give an informal proof,
stressing visualisation. Dividing by 2, we have to show that the average value
a1 :=
1
2
T (q13)+
1
2
T (q23) is at most the average value a2 := 12T (q13 )+ 12T (q23+).
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Let SL be the straight line segment in R2 joining the points (q13   ; T (q13   ))
and (q23 + ; T (q23 + )), and let SL be the straight line segment joining the
points (q13; T (q13)) and (q23; T (q23)). Since a1 and a2 are, respectively, the second
coordinates of the points on SL and SL with the rst coordinate 1
2
q13 +
1
2
q23,
it su¢ ces to show that SL is belowSL. This follows once we prove that Ts
graph is belowSL (as T is convex on [1=2; 1] and SL joins two points on Ts
graph on [1=2; 1]). If q13     1=2, this is trivial by Ts convexity on [1=2; 1].
Now let q13    < 1=2. Let SL0 be the straight line segments joining the points
(q13 ; T (q13 )) and (1 (q13 ); T (1 (q13 ))), and let SL00 be the straight line
segment joining the points (1  (q13  ); T (1  (q13  ))) and (q23+ ; T (q23+ )).
Check using Ts properties that LS 0 passes through the point (1=2; 1=2). This
implies that (*) Ts graph is belowSL0 on [1=2; 1], and that (**) SL00 is steeper
than SL0 (by Ts convexity on [1=2; 1]). Also, (***) Ts graph is belowSL00
(again by Ts convexity on [1=2; 1]). In sum, on [1=2; 1], Ts graph is (by (*) and
(***)) belowboth SL0 and SL00 which are both belowSL by (**). So, still on
[1=2; 1], Ts graph is belowSL. This proves (13). Applying (13) with  = 1 q23,
we obtain
T (q13) + T (q23)  T (q13   (1 + q23)) + T (1):
On the right side, T (1) = 1 and (as q13  (1+q23)  1 q12 and as T is increasing)
T (q13  (1 + q23))  T (1  q12) = 1  T (q12). So T (q13) + T (q23)  1+ 1  T (q12),
i.e., T (q12) + T (q13) + T (q23)  2, as claimed.
Claim 2. pk  0 for all k = 1; 2; 3.
We only show that p1  0, as the proofs for p2 and p3 are analogous. We have
to prove that t13+ t23  t12  0, i.e., that T (q13)+T (q23)  T (q12), or equivalently,
that T (q1+q3)+T (q2+q3)  T (q1+q2). As T is increasing, it su¢ ces to establish
that T (q1) + T (q2)  T (q1 + q2). We again consider three cases.
Case 1 : q1 + q2  1=2. Suppose q1  q2 (otherwise swap the roles of q1 and
q2). For all   0 such that q1     0, we have
T (q1) + T (q2)  T (q1   ) + T (q2 + ),
as T is concave on [0; 1=2] and 0  q1     q1  q2  q2 +   1=2. So, for
 = q1,
T (q1) + T (q2)  T (0) + T (q2 + q1) = T (q1 + q2):
Case 2 : q1 + q2 > 1=2 but q1; q2  1=2. By (i)-(iii),
T (q1) + T (q2)  q1 + q2  T (q1 + q2).
Case 3 : q1 > 1=2 or q2 > 1=2. Suppose q2 > 1=2 (otherwise swap q1 and q2 in
the proof). Then q1 < 1=2, since otherwise q1 + q2 > 1. Let y := 1  q1   q2. As
y < 1=2, an argument analogous to that in Case 1 yields T (q1)+T (y)  T (q1+y),
i.e., T (q1)+T (1 q1 q2)  T (1 q2). So, by (i), T (q1)+1 T (q1+q2)  1 T (q2),
i.e., T (q1) + T (q2)  T (q1 + q2). 
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One might wonder why the pooling function constructed in this proof violates
conditional consensus compatibility. (It must do so, because otherwise pooling
would be linear hence neutral by Theorem 5(a).) Let 
 and X be as in the
proof, and consider a prole with complete unanimity: all individuals i assign
probability 0 to !1, 1/4 to !2, 1/4 to !3, and 1/2 to !4. As f!1g is the di¤erence
of two events in X (e.g. f!1; !2gnf!2; !3g), implication preservation (which is
equivalent to conditional consensus compatibility) would require !1s collective
probability to be 0 as well. But !1s collective probability is (in the notation of
the proof) given by
p1 =
t12 + t13   t23
2
=
T (q12) + T (q13)  T (q23)
2
.
Here, qkl is the collective probability of f!k; !lg under a linear pooling function,
so that qkl is the probability which each individual assigns to f!k; !lg. So
p1 =
T (1=4) + T (1=4)  T (1=2)
2
= T (1=4)  T (1=2)
2
,
which is strictly positive as T is strictly concave on [0; 1=2] with T (0) = 0.
44
